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Article

A Corporate Right to Privacy
Elizabeth Pollman

†

Do corporations have a constitutional right to privacy?
Could a corporation claim a constitutional right to the nondisclosure of its information, as AT&T might have argued in its
recent Freedom of Information Act case? Might a corporation
have a privacy claim if the Securities and Exchange Commission required it to disclose health information about its CEO, as
Apple resisted disclosing information about Steve Jobs’s declining health? Does the ACLU have a right to privacy that is violated by the government’s mass collection and surveillance of
its phone call metadata? Should corporations have such a right
to privacy?
The Supreme Court has never squarely answered the corporate right to privacy question. A 1950 case, United States v.
Morton Salt Co., has been cited for the proposition that corporations have no constitutional right to privacy, but that was not
the holding of the case, which notably predated the Court’s dec1
laration of a constitutional right to privacy. More recently in
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FCC v. AT&T, in which AT&T claimed a “personal privacy” exemption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to shield
its documents from public disclosure, the Court decided the
case as a matter of statutory interpretation, specifically noting
that the corporation had made no constitutional privacy
2
claims. Other federal and state courts have diverged on the issue of a corporate constitutional right to privacy—some courts
have rejected claims in opinions with little or flawed reasoning,
and some have recognized a limited corporate right to privacy
under the Federal Constitution in contexts like discovery and
subpoenas, but have left the contours of the corporate right un3
defined.
This Article explores this question and attempts to provide
a principled approach for answering it. Scholars have mined
the depths of other topics such as whether corporations should
4
have privacy rights at common law, whether trade secret law
5
resembles common law privacy torts, and, most relatedly,
whether corporations should have Fourth Amendment protec6
7
tions. Others have conducted an economic analysis of privacy.
And scholars have examined privacy concerns, constitutional
and otherwise, in various specific contexts such as litigation

1. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (establishing
the standard under the Fourth Amendment for judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas); see infra Part I.A.
2. FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011). The case turned on the
meaning of the word “personal” for purposes of the FOIA “personal privacy”
exemption. The Court concluded that corporations may not claim the FOIA
personal privacy exemption because although the statute defines “person” to
include corporations, adjectives like “personal” do not necessarily reflect the
ordinary meaning of their corresponding nouns and the context of the statute
does not support a reading that would include corporations. Id. at 1181–85.
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights:
Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
607 (1987).
5. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 231–47, 253–56 (1988).
6. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests,
92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 76–80 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Citizens
United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 77, 83–84 (2010);
Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814–19
(2005) [hereinafter Slobogin, Subpoenas].
7. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231–47 (1981);
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996); Richard A. Posner, The Right of
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).
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discovery, subpoenas, bank secrecy, and FOIA exemptions,
including the recent FCC v. AT&T case concerning the “per11
sonal privacy” exemption. Yet scholars have all but overlooked
whether a corporate constitutional right to privacy exists as
12
such.
8. Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-Based
Theory of Civil Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 779–81,
810–13 (2005); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is
It Time To Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2009); see also
Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 357 (1987). See generally
JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (2014) (describing the application of privacy case law to corporate
litigation).
9. See, e.g., Slobogin, Subpoenas, supra note 6, at 809–10; Abraham
Tabaie, Note, Protecting Privacy Expectations and Personal Documents in SEC
Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 815 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States
Government’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell
for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 1, 3–7 (2010);
Laura Szarmach, Note, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United
States’ Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 409, 431 (2010).
11. See Daniel Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T: The Idolatry of Corporations
and Impersonal Privacy (Hofstra Univ. Legal Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 11-16, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1884965; Scott A. Hartman, Comment, Privacy, Personhood, and
the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(C) in Context, 120 YALE L.J. 379 (2010); Maeve
E. Huggins, Comment, Don’t Take It Personally: Supreme Court Finds Corporations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 481 (2011); Kathleen Vermazen Radez, Survey, The Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4: Protecting Corporate Reputation in the Post-Crash
Regulatory Environment, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 632, 650–51, 663 (2010).
Commentators on the recent AT&T case asserted with little explanation that
corporations have no, and ought to have no, right to privacy. E.g., Dahlia
Lithwick, Privacy Rights Inc., SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010, 6:42 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2270956/; Nell Minow, Supreme Court to Consider
Corporate “Privacy” Rights, DAILY VIEWPOINT (Nov. 18, 2010), http://
www3.gmiratings.com/home/2010/11/supreme-court-to-consider-corporate
-privacy-rights/; Alan B. Morrison, Privacy for People, Not Corporations, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2010, 4:31 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/
46901.html.
12. There is a very small literature examining this question and it is limited in approach. See EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL & GROUP PRIVACY
140–46 (2d prtg. 2004), discussed infra Part III.A; RUSSELL B. STEVENSON,
JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 6,
69–75 (1980) (discussing corporate interest in preserving the security of information and arguing that a corporate right to privacy is “on its face an absurdity” because privacy involves human values that a corporation cannot
claim); William C. Lindsay, Comment, When Uncle Sam Calls Does Ma Bell
Have To Answer?: Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Corporate Informational Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915 (1985) (arguing that corporations
should have a constitutional right to informational privacy under Whalen v.
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The question of whether corporations have, or should have,
a constitutional right to privacy merits more consideration.
Privacy can facilitate both socially beneficial and harmful activ13
ity. Businesses would be impaired without some ability to con14
trol access to their information and affairs. Trade secret, corporate privileges, and other statutory and common law
protections may fill this need, though, and constitutional privacy interests may not be implicated in these business circum15
stances. Some corporations are not large businesses, however;
they may be formed by small groups of individuals associating
to pursue social, political, or religious goals. The corporation
may be better positioned or the only effective actor to vindicate
the privacy interests of these individuals acting in association.
Further, the freedom to associate, a right that is understood to
extend to groups including corporations, is linked to the concept
16
of privacy. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which
the Supreme Court held that state-compelled disclosure of the
civil rights group’s membership list was invalid as restraining
the members’ freedom of association, the Court recognized “the
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in
17
one’s associations.” Constitutional rights are interdependent
18
with and constrain government power. Thus, there are reaRoe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). Stevenson asserts that “[c]orporations can no more
be injured by an invasion of their ‘privacy’ than they can swear, scratch, make
love, or engage in any of the other flesh-and-blood activities that the walls of
privacy serve to protect from unwanted observation.” STEVENSON, supra, at
69.
13. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 40 (1998) (“Privacy can be used for good or ill, to help or to harm.”);
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 99 (2008) (“Privacy facilitates
many activities, from the worthy to the wicked.”).
14. See, e.g., Privacy and the Rights of Federal Employees: Hearing on S.
3779 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 818 (1967) (“If all written memos and policy discussions
were subject to immediate publication, or if private organizations knew they
were under continuous monitoring by government agents, much of the debate
would automatically become formalized. . . . [G]radual accommodation of divergent views within the organization would be hampered.”).
15. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 5, at 231–47.
16. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
17. Id.
18. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 343–45 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes, Why
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 725 (1998) (“Most often, rights police the
kinds of justifications government can act on in different spheres rather than
protecting atomistic interests in autonomy, or liberty, or dignity. Rights there-
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sons to believe a constitutional right to privacy may be an important check against government power for individuals who
act together through the corporate form, but that according
such a right to all corporations would be unfounded and could
19
powerfully shield them from investigation or regulation.
Any extension of the right to corporations indeed requires
particularly careful analysis as the Federal Constitution includes no express reference to a right to privacy and it is one of
20
the least defined rights in the law. Courts have found roots for
21
privacy in a variety of provisions and their “penumbras.” In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court’s first recognition
of an independent right to privacy, the Court famously located
the right in “zones of privacy” emanating from the First, Third,
22
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Since then, the Court
has expanded this line of cases concerning autonomy in making
certain important decisions by relying on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process

fore serve as tools courts use to evaluate the social meanings and expressive
dimensions of governmental action.”); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, Rights as
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153–67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (characterizing rights as “trumps” that protect individual interests against collective
goals or majoritarian preferences); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977) (same); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 36
(1980) (conceiving of rights as “trumps” that “can cut across or ‘trump’ powers”). For a discussion of what it means for a right to have constitutional status, see Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1079, 1087 (2013) (“[T]he attributes of constitutionality behave more like
sticks in a bundle than like a set of necessary bases and the payoffs that follow
. . . .”).
19. This Article uses the term “rights” as understood in popular usage; a
right privileges or protects the interest or claim of the right holder, but is not
absolute because in a particular instance a rival interest could prevail. See
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 154 (2003).
20. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 1 (2010). Privacy law is a patchwork of legal sources: the Constitution, state constitutions, federal and state statutes, and common law. See
generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330–64 (1967) (discussing
various historical developments in U.S. privacy law). Depending on the circumstances, different legal doctrines may govern the resolution of a claimed
privacy right. This Article concerns a right of privacy under the Federal Constitution.
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965). See generally
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308–12 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the sources of protected rights of “personhood”); WESTIN, supra
note 20, at 349–56 (describing Griswold in the context of a historical review of
American privacy law).
22. 381 U.S. at 484.
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Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court
has also raised the possibility of a separate privacy interest
premised on nondisclosure of information that stems from the
24
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This Article argues that most corporations in most circumstances should not have a constitutional right to privacy. There
is simply no natural person, or persons, associated in a corporation with a privacy interest at stake and a need for the corporation to vindicate it. Yet because corporations are not monolithic, but rather exist along a spectrum, this Article also
highlights that some nonprofit and private corporations could
present a stronger claim in limited circumstances given their
varying purposes and dynamics, particularly in social, political,
25
and religious realms.
The Article develops this analysis in three parts. Part I
shows it is an open question in Supreme Court jurisprudence
whether corporations have a constitutional right to privacy and
provides the first scholarly treatment of the growing body of
conflicting law in the lower courts on this unresolved issue.
Part II examines corporate rights jurisprudence, showing that
the Court has not developed a coherent method or test for these
determinations, but has often relied on a view of the corporation as an association in extending rights to corporations on a
derivative basis. Building on the underlying framework of the
jurisprudence, and the closest articulations of a test the Court
has made, this Article asserts that in determining whether to
accord a right to a corporation, we should look to whether the
purpose of the right is served by according it to the corporation
in question—that is, whether it is necessary in order to protect
natural persons—and whether the right is of a type that
inheres only in an individual in his or her individual capacity.
23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–76 (2003) (discussing privacy case law history).
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. As this Article was in the publication process, the Supreme Court
handed down its opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014), holding that federal regulations requiring employers to provide
insurance coverage for certain forms of contraception violate the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as applied to certain closely held
corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family with
sincerely held religious beliefs. Notably, the Court based its decision on statutory grounds under RFRA rather than the First Amendment. For a critical
discussion of the case, see Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
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Using this approach, Part III explores whether the right to privacy should extend to corporations. Specifically, the analysis
looks to whether a corporate right to privacy would protect the
privacy interests of the people involved, such as shareholders,
directors, and officers, or other participants such as employees.
This approach keeps in focus that people are the object of constitutional protection; granting rights to corporations makes
sense only as a means to protect people and carry out the purpose of the right. Finally, Part III explores deeper issues raised
by the inquiry—whether there is something specific about the
right to privacy or the corporate form that would categorically
foreclose all corporations from having such a right—and considers what the future may hold in this area.
I. THE OPEN QUESTION OF CORPORATE PRIVACY
The existing case law addressing whether corporations
have a constitutional right to privacy is in disarray and has, to
date, escaped scholarly attention. Above all, the existing case
law shows that the Supreme Court has not squarely answered
the question and that there is a small, but growing body of conflicting law in the lower federal courts and state courts on this
unresolved issue. This Part examines the case law, which
shows the growing importance of the issue and the need for a
more coherent approach to the corporate privacy question and
26
to corporate rights jurisprudence more generally.

26. Although there is a short line of cases that use the term “commercial
privacy” in their rationale, these cases concern trade secret or unfair competition law and do not clearly implicate a constitutional right. See Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (“A most fundamental human
right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or
is made profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures
is unchallengeable.” (footnote omitted)); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1970) (“Commercial privacy must be protected from espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or
prevented.”); BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 129, 145–46 (citing Kewanee Oil in
support of a corporation’s right to protect trade secrets); M. Ryan Calo, The
Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1134 n.13 (2011) (noting that
the invasion of “commercial privacy” in duPont might have been better described as unfair competition); Rowe, supra note 8, at 1434–35 (noting that
although Kewanee Oil and duPont “appear to have laid the foundation for
commercial privacy in trade secret jurisprudence, the concept has remained
undefined”).
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A. SUPREME COURT: UNITED STATES V. MORTON SALT CO.
Morton Salt is the Supreme Court’s primary decision that,
at least notionally, addresses whether corporations have a con27
stitutional right to privacy. In it, the Court stated, “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of
28
a right to privacy.” That phrase, and the few paragraphs of
discussion around it, has received little to no scrutiny, however,
and later courts have relied on it to inconsistently reject and
29
recognize a corporate right to privacy. This section explores
the ways in which Morton Salt left open the question of whether corporations have a constitutional right to privacy.
The case concerned whether the Federal Trade Commission could require Morton Salt, a corporation, to file reports
showing compliance with an earlier order to stop engaging in
30
certain trade practices. Much of the Supreme Court’s opinion
focused on three of Morton Salt’s claims regarding jurisdiction
and the Administrative Procedure Act; only a small sliver addressed Morton Salt’s other argument, that the order was “novel and arbitrary and violate[d] the Fourth and Fifth Amend31
ments to the Constitution.”
The Court began that sliver of explanation by framing privacy, the “right to be let alone,” as only concerning Fourth
Amendment search and seizure protections and the Fifth
32
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This narrow
27. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). California
Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), is occasionally also cited in connection with the concept of corporations’ constitutional privacy. E.g., Jadwin v.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 486 n.10 (Minn. 1985). California Bankers concerned the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, which required financial institutions to keep records of some customers
and large transactions. Cal. Bankers, 416 U.S. at 30–41. The Court focused on
the plaintiffs’ specific claims rather than a right to privacy as such, holding
the First Amendment claim was premature, the Fourth Amendment claim
failed because the regulations did not impose an unreasonable reporting requirement (citing Morton Salt), and the Fifth Amendment claim failed because
corporations have no privilege against self-incrimination and the banks did
not have standing to assert claims on behalf of customers. Id. at 41–43, 52,
56–57, 66–67, 71.
28. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652.
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 634.
31. See id. at 638, 651–54. Morton Salt is often cited for its rule regarding
the scope of issues that may be litigated in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1135 (2d Cir. 1995).
32. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52 (citations omitted). There is a history
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims in this vein. See POSNER, supra note 7,
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view reflects the early state of privacy jurisprudence at the
33
time. Notably, this case predated the Court’s recognition in
Griswold v. Connecticut of an independent right to privacy
based on a variety of Bill of Rights provisions creating a “zone
of privacy” and the Court’s case law concerning a constitutional
34
right to privacy in nondisclosure of personal information.
Thus, Morton Salt tells us little, if anything, about whether the
Court would conclude that corporations have a right to privacy,
as currently understood.
Further, besides predating the Court’s privacy jurisprudence, Morton Salt also presented particularly weak circumstances for finding a privacy interest with the corporation’s attempt to completely avoid the Commission’s valid request for
information about its trade practices. With the Court’s narrow
framing of privacy in place, it very quickly rejected Morton
35
Salt’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. The Court cited
Oklahoma Press, in which it had ruled in similar circumstances
that no actual search or seizure occurred where the Commission properly subpoenaed corporate records pursuant to a valid
36
statute. Like Morton Salt, the corporations there had not objected to a specific defect in the breadth or terms of the request
for corporate records, and so the Court rejected their claims as
37
effectively seeking total immunity from the statute. The Court
also cited Hale v. Henkel, which established that corporations
cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and that corporations are not beyond the reach
38
of congressional and judicial power.
at 311 (“Long before the tort right of privacy came before the Supreme Court,
and even before Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article on privacy,
the Court was confronted with claims to the protection of privacy under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”).
33. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence. See also Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law:
Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 249, 277–78 (1993) (“In the 1940s and ’50s, the Court spoke often of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of a right of privacy.”).
34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See infra Part III.A
for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence.
35. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–54.
36. Id. at 651–52 (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946)).
37. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 195–96; see Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 653–54.
38. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
70 (1906)); see also Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 196 (“Petitioners’ plea that the
Fourth Amendment places them so far above the law that they are beyond the
reach of congressional and judicial power as those powers have been exerted
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The subsequent paragraph of the opinion, following the
Court’s compact rejection of Morton Salt’s claims, is home to
the Court’s oft-quoted statement that “corporations can claim
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy”:
While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, corporations can
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often
carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. Even if one were
to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies
have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior
39
is consistent with the law and the public interest.

Taken out of context the “no equality” phrase has been wrongly
understood as establishing that corporations have no right to
40
privacy. The plain language of the phrase does not establish
such a proposition; it says only that such a right is not equal to
that of individuals. In addition, the above paragraph shows
that before the “no equality” phrase, the Court recognized that
there are some limits to the government’s access to corporate
41
information in investigations. Thus, the language, textual
here only raises the ghost of controversy long since settled adversely to their
claim.”).
39. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted).
40. In dicta in two concurrences, a Supreme Court Justice has taken Morton Salt as establishing that corporations have not just an unequal right, but
no right to privacy. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 184 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). Without providing a citation, Justice Rehnquist stated in
a dissent in which he argued against negative free speech rights for corporations: “This argument is bolstered by the fact that the two constitutional liberties most closely analogous to the right to refrain from speaking—the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and the constitutional right of privacy—
have been denied to corporations based on their corporate status.” Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, other courts have also cited Morton Salt or other cases for
the proposition that corporations have no right to privacy. See infra note 43;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652IA, cmt. c (1977) (citing Morton Salt for the proposition that “[a] corporation has no such right of privacy”).
41. For the proposition that corporations “may and should have protection
from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation,” Morton
Salt, 338 U.S. at 652, the Court cited American Tobacco, an opinion by Justice
Holmes holding that the Federal Trade Commission did not have unlimited
access to corporations’ papers in connection with an investigation about possi-
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context, and more general jurisprudential context show the
Court did not hold that corporations have no right to privacy,
but rather suggested that corporations have a Fourth Amend42
ment right unequal to that of individuals.
In sum, with its dated view of privacy and “no equality”
phrasing, Morton Salt did not squarely resolve whether corporations have a constitutional right to privacy. While it rejected
equality in privacy protection for corporations with regard to
Fourth Amendment protection for the type of agency order it
was addressing, it did not answer the question more generally
or with regard to other privacy interests.
B. POST-MORTON SALT: CONFLICT IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS
Lower courts have relied on Morton Salt in reaching divergent answers to the question of whether a corporation may
claim a constitutional right to privacy. Their disparity underscores that Morton Salt left much unresolved and their reasoning—often conclusory, formalistic, or undeveloped—shows that
the area needs greater illumination.

ble unfair competition practices. FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
There, the Court noted that while the Commission could access documentary
evidence it could not consistent with the Fourth Amendment “direct fishing
expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime” because it would be “contrary to first principles of justice.” Id.
at 306.
42. As a matter of precedential weight, it is worth noting that some jurists
and commentators might additionally view the Morton Salt reasoning, based
on the “concession” view of the corporation, as problematic. The “concession”
view of corporations as creatures of the state, artificial beings subject to enhanced regulation, was developed and popularized between the seventeenth
and nineteenth centuries, but the Supreme Court had largely shifted away
from that view by 1950, and the Court has since called it an “extreme position.” See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)
(characterizing the argument that “corporations, as creatures of the State,
have only those rights granted them by the State” as an “extreme position”);
see also, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1011–12 (discussing the decline of the concession view
in the mid-nineteenth century). For arguments that the “concession” view of
the corporation should be rehabilitated, see David Ciepley, Neither Persons
nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTS.
2 (2013); Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 731 (2013); Stefan Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA.
L. REV. 327 (2014).
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1. Cases Rejecting a Corporate Constitutional Right to Privacy
Nearly a dozen courts have cited Morton Salt, with little
explanation, for the proposition that corporations do not have a
43
constitutional right to privacy. The Ninth Circuit has come to

43. Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]he District Court correctly found that, as an entity, Baker clearly
had no privacy interest capable of protection at stake here” and citing Morton
Salt (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters., Inc. v. NDC
of Cal., L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10,
2011) (stating “business entities do not have a right to privacy” and citing Arnold with internal citation to Morton Salt); Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc.
v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 2006)
(rejecting privacy claims of lobbying firms because the federal constitutional
right to privacy extends only to natural persons, and citing California Bankers
Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974), with internal quotation to Morton
Salt); Muratore v. Dep’t of Treasury, 315 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310–11 (W.D.N.Y.
2004) (quoting as binding authority Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Browning-Ferris which relied on Morton Salt: “[T]he Supreme Court has held that ‘a
corporation has no . . . right to privacy.’ A demand for ESI’s corporate documents, then, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted));
Doe v. Veneman, 230 F. Supp. 2d 739, 750 n.5 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (“[A] business
organization is a person only by legal fiction. It is not an individual with Constitutionally protected rights.” (citing Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52)), overruled on other grounds, 380 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2004); Clinton Cmty. Hosp.
Corp. v. S. Md. Med. Ctr., 374 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D. Md. 1974) (holding that a
corporation cannot assert an injury to its aesthetic enjoyment of the environment under NEPA, and citing Morton Salt for the proposition that “[i]t is clear
that corporations do not enjoy a right to privacy”); Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (denying a corporation a
state statutory right to privacy, stating that “[c]ases from other jurisdictions
unanimously deny a right of privacy to corporations,” and citing Morton Salt);
Health Cent. v. Comm’r of Ins., 393 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. Mich. 1986)
(stating that “the right of privacy is primarily designed to protect the feelings
and sensibilities of human beings and does not protect artificial entities” and
citing Morton Salt); see also Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp.
173, 175 (D. Md. 1966) (stating that as a corporation the plaintiff “cannot be
said to possess a right of privacy” and citing Morton Salt, despite the case at
hand being a civil suit between private parties) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Ass’n for Pres. of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Emergency Civil Liberties Comm., 236 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (rejecting a corporation’s claim for privacy and citing Morton Salt for the proposition that “[t]here
are statements in cases decided elsewhere that a corporation has no right of
privacy”); supra note 40 (discussing dicta in two Supreme Court concurrences
that reference Morton Salt as establishing that corporations have no right to
privacy); cf. Regency Catering Servs., Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 640 F.
Supp. 29, 30–31 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (rejecting a catering corporation’s privacy
claim based on city disclosure of mouse infestation because constitutional privacy cases involved “intensely personal aspects of the private lives of individuals” and plaintiff failed to cite any case which held a corporation could claim a
right to privacy); In re Food Int’l, Inc., Nos. 97-27194 JKF, 98-2173, 1999 WL
1052525, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1999) (following Regency Catering in
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the same result, while providing a bit more reasoning. In Fleck
& Associates, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, the Ninth Circuit rejected
a corporation’s claim that a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of live sex act businesses violated its constitutional right
44
to privacy. The corporation, a social club for gay men, specifically identified the source of its privacy right as the liberty
45
guarantee described in Lawrence v. Texas.
The Ninth Circuit started its analysis with Morton Salt’s
statement that “corporations can claim no equality with indi46
viduals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.” It then reasoned that because corporations are not entitled to “purely per47
sonal guarantees” and because “it is hard to imagine a
constitutional guarantee that could be more inherently personal and therefore unavailable to a corporate entity” than priva48
cy, corporations have no right to privacy. The court quoted
Chief Justice Marshall’s well-known characterization of a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and exist49
ing only in contemplation of law.” And in its own words, the
court further explained: “Corporations are not self-defining autonomous creatures worthy of respect and dignity in the relevant sense. Neither do they have private lives, let alone ‘private
50
lives in matters pertaining to sex’ as Fleck would have it.”
Thus, the court formalistically reasoned that because a corporation is an artificial being and not the type of creature that
has a private life, corporations do not have a cognizable right to
privacy. For this reason, the court ruled that the corporation
had failed to plead “the invasion of any cognizable right,” and
51
so had failed to establish standing.
rejecting a privacy claim of a restaurant corporation that had an incident publicized about its cook allegedly spitting in a police officer’s food).
44. 471 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 1104 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
46. Id. (quoting Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652).
47. Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14).
48. Id. at 1104–05.
49. Id. at 1105 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1104. The court stated that Fleck’s claim was “really just a
claim that Fleck should be allowed to champion the liberty interests of its customers,” and that it could not do so under traditional standing doctrine because it failed to meet the constitutional requirements for standing. Id. at
1105. Fleck also could not obtain associational standing because it did not
have “members” as required by the doctrine because its “members” were merely customers and the purpose of the “association” was for profit, not to “‘ex-
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2. Cases Recognizing a Limited Corporate Constitutional
Right to Privacy
In contrast to the various state courts, federal district
courts, and the Ninth Circuit, which have stated that corporations lack a right to privacy, either with a conclusory approach
or based on the notion that corporations are artificial and unlike natural persons, the D.C. Circuit and California state
52
courts have recognized a limited corporate right to privacy.
These cases accord a lessened privacy right to corporations, giving a nod to Morton Salt’s “no equality” phrase, but nonetheless
53
recognizing a right.
The beginning of this line of cases goes back over thirty
years and involves a battle with the Church of Scientology over
sealing and returning seized documents. In United States v.
Hubbard, the D.C. Circuit found that the Church, a corporation
and third party to the underlying litigation, had a privacy interest in preventing its seized documents from becoming pub54
lic. The court left undefined the source of the privacy interest,
55
but stated that it was at least partly a constitutional matter.
press the collective views and protect the collective interests’ of their members.” Id. at 1105–06 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 345 (1977)).
52. A 1979 case from the District of Puerto Rico also suggested that corporations enjoy a limited privacy right. Colegio Puertorriqueño De Niñas, Liceo
Ponceño, Inc. v. Pesquera De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761, 765–66 (1979).
There, several private schools and a professional organization of private
schools claimed that a state inquiry into the cost of running the schools violated their privacy rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 763. The court examined the right to privacy case law and
stated: “The foregoing does not mean that corporations or other entities which
do not possess human individuality do not enjoy privacy rights. However, their
sphere of protected privacy is lesser in scope than that of individuals.” Id. at
765 (citation omitted). The court concluded that the state inquiry there did not
transgress the bounds of any constitutional guarantees, including a privacy
interest in nondisclosure under Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Pesquera
De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. at 766–68.
53. See supra Part I.A.
54. 650 F.2d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 302–03 (“Although we decline the Church’s invitation expressly
to ground the Church’s protectible interests in the Constitution’s provisions,
we find the kinds of interests asserted to have some constitutional footing,
both cognate to and supportive of, constitutional rights.”). The court supported
this assertion by noting that corporations have rights under the Fourth
Amendment which “protect[s] legitimate expectations of privacy,” and it also
generally referred to the right to privacy as stemming from the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments which protect against deprivations of liberty and “encroachment upon a constitutionally recognized sphere of personal privacy.” Id.
at 304–05.
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Referencing Morton Salt as well as a mix of state and federal
56
cases, the court concluded that while the “public attributes of
corporations may indeed reduce pro tanto the reasonability of
their expectation of privacy,” a bright line could not be drawn
57
at the corporate structure. Instead, “the nature and purposes
of the corporate entity and the nature of the interest sought to
be protected will determine the question whether under given
58
facts the corporation per se has a protectible privacy interest.”
Finally, without deeper explanation or greater specificity, the
court emphasized that the corporation at hand was a church:
“[W]hether acting for itself or on behalf of its members, surely
the privacy interests of a ‘church’ must be assessed somewhat
differently from the privacy interests of other sorts of ‘corpora59
tions.’”
Although later vacated on other grounds, another case
from the D.C. Circuit also recognized a corporation as having a
constitutional privacy interest in the nondisclosure of docu60
ments. In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., non-party Mobil Oil sought to seal its documents obtained in discovery and
61
not used at trial. The panel reasoned that a court might implicate a constitutional privacy interest in nondisclosure when it
forces disclosure of personal information in the discovery context, and in those circumstances a corporation’s interest would
62
be “essentially identical” to an individual’s.
56. Id. at 305–06. The Hubbard court referred to privacy as having been
embraced both in D.C. and in California, seemingly because the documents
seized from the Church of Scientology were from church buildings in Los Angeles. Since Hubbard, California courts have clarified that corporations may
not claim a right to privacy under the California Constitution. Roberts v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 791 (1983).
57. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 306.
58. Id.
59. Id. (“[A]t least certain types of organizations—corporate or noncorporate—should be able to assert in good faith the privacy interests of their
members.”).
60. Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 1014–15, 1023, 1028–29.
62. Id. at 1021–22, 1025–29 (recognizing that corporations have an unequal Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy, but that qualification is “to
allow adequate policing of corporate conduct” which is not the purpose of discovery; “The purpose of discovery is not affected by the fact that a party to the
suit is a corporation.”). On rehearing, the en banc court vacated the panel decision and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light
of a then-recent Supreme Court case, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20 (1984). The en banc court left open its view of the panel’s decision regarding
privacy; subsequently, other courts have continued to cite or discuss the pan-
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The California line of cases has relied on and amplified the
D.C. Circuit case law. Most notably, in Roberts v. Gulf Oil
Corp., concerning a subpoena duces tecum seeking information
from a corporate taxpayer about its property, a California appellate court held that corporations do not have a right to privacy under the California Constitution, nor a fundamental
63
right to privacy, but do have a “general right to privacy.” The
court lodged this in “some combination of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary or unjustifiable state deprivations of liberty and the Fifth
64
Amendment.” The court quoted at length from Morton Salt,
and then citing the D.C. Circuit’s Hubbard case, stated: “Although corporations have a lesser right to privacy than human
beings and are not entitled to claim a right to privacy in terms
of a fundamental right, some right to privacy exists. Privacy
rights accorded to artificial entities are not stagnant, but de65
pend on the circumstances.”
The Roberts court then recognized two factors for determining the strength of a business entity’s privacy right: (1) the
strength of the nexus between the entity and the human be66
ings, and (2) the context of the controversy. Applying this test,
the court noted that “[w]ithout denigrating the fact that a corporation does enjoy a right to privacy in some circumstances,”
Gulf Oil did not in the case at hand because there was no nexus
to an individual’s privacy and a privacy right would have been
“unreasonable” in the context of determining Gulf Oil’s “fair
67
share of taxes.”
el’s decision in Tavoulareas, despite its procedural infirmity. See, e.g., Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1996); Cook v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 550–51 (E.D. Cal. 1990), overruling recognized on other grounds, Chatman v. Felker, No. Civ. S-03-2415 JAM, 2009 WL
173515 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D.D.C. 1987).
But see Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (“The court, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision in Tavoulareas,
and it therefore has no precedential value.”).
63. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 406–12 (Ct. App. 1983).
The court reasoned that Gulf Oil’s rights were not so fundamental as to require meticulous scrutiny because “[t]he interest of a taxpayer to be free from
incursions into his or her files is not of the same constitutional significance as
the personal right to determine whether to beget a child.” Id. at 410 (citing
Morton Salt).
64. Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 411.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 412. The court wove a bit of concession theory into its analysis
(“Gulf is a corporation which exists at the pleasure of the state.”), but its con-

POLLMAN_4fmt

2014]

11/6/2014 3:54 PM

CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

43
68

Other California courts have followed Roberts, although
sometimes assuming that corporations have such a right with69
out deciding the issue on the merits. Although the California
case law consists of multiple cases spanning decades, the courts
have not developed a framework for better understanding the
clusion seems largely driven by the context of a corporation asserting a privacy
right to prevent a tax assessor from obtaining information to determine its
corporate taxes.
68. Lazaro v. Lomarey, Inc., No. C 09-02013 RMW (PVT), 2010 WL
3636207, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (granting motion to compel against
corporate defendant, but noting that corporations have some right to privacy);
Saca v. J.P. Molyneux Studio Ltd., No. CIV-S06-2818 MCE EFB, 2008 WL
62181, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (noting that “[t]he privacy rights of
businesses are accorded . . . less weight” and including business entities’ privacy interests in balancing analysis); Whittall v. Henry Schein, Inc., No.
CIVS051629 WBJ BCH, 2006 WL 902571, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006)
(balancing “[b]oth corporate and individual privacy rights . . . at issue”);
S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 50 (Ct.
App. 2010) (interpreting an insurance provision using the phrase “a person’s
right to privacy” with reference to California’s line of privacy cases stemming
from the context of discovery and subpoenas); Ameri-Med. Corp. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 383–84 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding respondents had a legitimate interest in determining whether non-reimbursable
fees were included in a medical bill pertinent to their workers’ compensation
claim, but they “[did] not have an automatic right to unfettered access to books
and records regarding the medical clinic’s overall business operation” and the
clinic corporation “retain[ed] a privacy interest in financial and employment
information”).
69. Conn. Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 P.3d 868, 874–75 (Cal. 2000)
(assuming without deciding that corporate entities had constitutional privacy
rights where the trial court had not yet ruled on the privacy claims in a case
concerning the validity of subpoenas issued by a city council investigating
groundwater contamination); 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 163
Cal. Rptr. 3d 17, 42 (Ct. App. 2012) (assuming, without deciding, that medicinal marijuana collectives “have certain privacy expectations in the records
subject to disclosure” pursuant to a city ordinance, but holding there was no
invasion of privacy “given the heavily regulated area in which the collectives
operate”); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 846–47
(Ct. App. 2007) (“While we recognize there are serious questions as to the application of a federal right of privacy to corporations, we follow the approach
adopted by the court in Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, and decline to address the merits of the issue in this case . . . .” (citation omitted)); see
also Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 446, 457 (Ct. App. 2006) (assuming without deciding that a limited
liability partnership has privacy rights). In rejecting a corporation’s privacy
claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a recent case in the
Southern District of Florida likewise seemed to assume that a corporation
could claim such a right to privacy. See Palmat Intl., Inc. v. Holder, No. 1220229-CIV, 2013 WL 594695, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (rejecting an
individual and corporation’s claim that releasing bank records pursuant to a
treaty between Argentina and the United States would violate their right to
informational privacy under the U.S. Constitution).
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constitutional footing or definition of the right for corporations,
the different forms of constitutional privacy or contexts in
which a corporation’s privacy interests might be implicated,
and what it means to grant the corporation a privacy right at
the entity level.
II. APPROACHES TO CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The preceding Part showed that whether corporations have
a constitutional right to privacy is an open question, and it
highlighted the divergent approaches and results in the lower
courts that have previously gone unexamined. Courts have
struggled to find a coherent way of thinking about this challenging issue as it involves the amorphous and indeterminate
right to privacy and the theoretical and doctrinal difficulty of
corporate rights analysis.
The importance of this observation is two-fold: first, it
shows there is an opportunity for scholarly insight to be
brought to bear on this jurisprudential issue and second, it illustrates the deeper problem that courts lack a coherent approach to determining the scope of corporate constitutional
rights. The remainder of this Article aims to shed light on the
corporate privacy question, and in so doing, to provide more
generalizable insights for other timely topics such as corporate
70
speech and free exercise rights.
As a starting point, in order to understand why most corporations in most circumstances should not have a right to privacy, it is helpful to first understand why corporations receive
any constitutional protection and how the Supreme Court has
approached these questions in the past.
A. CORPORATE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically mention corporations. As a matter of constitutional text, no explanation is
provided regarding the application of constitutional provisions
70. For a discussion of whether business corporations have free exercise
rights, see Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1
(2013); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1565 (2013); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 303 (2014); Mark Tushnet, Do
For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 70 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/12/99CLRO70
-November.pdf.
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to corporations. It was thus left to the courts to decide whether corporations were the subject of constitutional protections, or
holders of rights, and whether those rights were coextensive
with the scope of individual rights.
The Supreme Court first addressed these questions in the
early nineteenth century in cases involving Article III diversity
jurisdiction, the Contract Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The Court showed a willingness
to extend constitutional protections to corporations in order to
protect rights of the people composing the corporation. For example, in the 1809 case Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,
the Supreme Court stated that the corporate entity was not a
“citizen” for purposes of Article III diversity jurisdiction, but
that it could look to the natural persons composing a corporation and find that diversity jurisdiction exists where there is
complete diversity of state citizenship between the sharehold72
ers of a corporate party and the opposing party. In the 1819
case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Court
held that a state legislature’s act to unilaterally alter a corpo73
rate charter violated the Contract Clause. The Court explained that although incorporation required a government
grant, the corporation had been “endowed by private individuals” and represented a contract covered by the protection of the
74
Contract Clause.
The Court’s willingness to extend protections to corporations in order to protect the constitutional rights of the individuals behind the corporation was limited, however. In the 1839
case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Court ruled that while
corporations may, according to the citizenship of their individual members, be treated as “citizens” for purposes of Article III
diversity jurisdiction, they are not “citizens” for purposes of Ar-

71. ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10–15 (2010) (noting the absence of textual
reference or explanation of the treatment of corporations in the Constitution).
72. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), overruled by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497 (1844) (holding that a corporation is treated as a “citizen” of the state in
which it is incorporated for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854) (establishing a conclusive
presumption that all shareholders of a corporation are citizens of the state of
incorporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
73. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650
(1819).
74. Id. at 632–39, 641–50.

ITS OF
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ticle IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court expressed concern that if it were to look through the corporate
form to the persons composing the corporation, it would undermine the limited liability protections that were gaining acceptance at the time and give those operating through the corporate form “far higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed
76
by the citizens of the state itself.” Thus, in some instances, the
characteristics of the corporate form prevented the Court from
according corporations some constitutional protections.
In the later part of the nineteenth century, the Court recognized equal protection and due process protections for corpo77
rations under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. The
Court gave little explanation for these rulings, but justified this
extension of constitutional protection on the basis that it protected the property interests of the people associating through
78
the corporate form. Justice Field explained, for example: “Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but with the
exception of a sole corporation, with which we are not concerned, they consist of aggregations of individuals united for
79
some legitimate business.” Further, “[i]t would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the
80
moment the person becomes a member of a corporation.”

75. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
76. Id.
77. See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 274 (1893); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889); Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188–89
(1888); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (headnotes).
For a discussion of the Santa Clara case, see Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving
Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1642–45.
78. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 25; Pollman, supra note 77, at 1644–
45.
79. This quote comes from Justice Field’s lower court opinion, sitting by
designation in County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 F. 722,
743 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), which was related to County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 18 F. 385, 402 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). See also Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co., 125 U.S. at 189 (“[C]orporations are
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose . . . .”); Blair &
Pollman, supra note 25, (manuscript at 12–20) (discussing the rationale of Supreme Court jurisprudence from the late nineteenth century recognizing corporations as having equal protection and due process protections under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments concerning property interests).
80. Cnty. of San Mateo, 13 F. at 744.
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Notably, the Court again extended these protections in the
context of protecting the property interests of shareholders and
based on a view of the corporation as an association. Again the
Court also limited the scope of protection where the right, or a
portion of the right, at issue could not be held derivatively by
the corporation. The Court, for example, clarified that while
due process protections extend to protect corporate property,
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is “the lib81
erty of natural, not artificial persons.” Further, as with Article
IV, the Court held that corporations are not “citizens” for purposes of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
82
Amendment. Thus, while the Court extended protections to
corporations to protect the property interests of the persons associating through the corporate form, it did not confuse corporations with “citizens,” and it recognized limits to maintain
83
states’ power to regulate corporations for the public good. Justice Field explained that due process protection extended to
corporations for property “because the property of a corporation
[was] in fact the property of the corporators,” but that life and
liberty protections did not because “the lives and liberties of the

81. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); see also
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (noting “the liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial,
persons”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (explaining that
corporations “cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees,” but they can claim protection for their business and
property); W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (“[T]he liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due
process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”); Ruth H. Bloch
& Naomi Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment 4–23 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing how the Court parsed
the Fourteenth Amendment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries so that the due process protection for liberty did not extend to corporations).
82. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178–82 (1868).
83. See Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 81, at 8–23 (explaining that the
Court “articulated limits on the applicability to corporations of the due-process
and privileges-and-immunities clauses” in the same cases that extended the
Fourteenth-Amendment guarantee of equal protection to corporations); see also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 257 (1898) (“Nor must we be understood as
saying that a State may not, by its courts, retain within its limits the assets of
a foreign corporation, in order that justice may be done to its own citizens; nor,
by appropriate action of its judicial tribunals, see to it that its own citizens are
not unjustly discriminated against . . . .”); Paul, 75 U.S. at 181 (explaining
that applying the Privileges and Immunities Clause to corporations would be
“utterly destructive of the independence and the harmony of the States”).
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individual corporators are not the life and liberty of the corpo84
ration.”
In the early twentieth century, the Court recognized corpo85
rations as subject to corporate criminal liability. In Hale v.
Henkel, the Court held that corporations enjoy Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
but may not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self86
incrimination. The Court justified Fourth Amendment protection for corporations again on the basis that corporations are
associations of individuals with rights: “A corporation is, after
all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name
and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to
87
such body.” But the Court explained that a corporation cannot
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because that right “is purely a personal privilege of the wit88
ness.” The Court explained “[i]t was never intended to permit
him [the corporate agent] to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he
89
were the agent of such person.” The Court thus drew a line between the rights that corporations derived from the people
composing them and the rights that belonged to people only as
individuals.
Over time, the Court’s distinction between the property
and liberty protections for corporations faded. This started in
1936 with the Court’s selective incorporation and extension of
speech and press rights to newspaper corporations in Grosjean
90
v. American Press Co., and was further developed in the 1950s
and 60s when the Court began to recognize associational and
91
speech rights of nonprofit organizations such as the NAACP

84. Cnty. of San Mateo, 13 F. at 747.
85. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–
96 (1909).
86. 201 U.S. 43, 69–70, 75–76 (1906).
87. Id. at 76.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id.
90. 297 U.S. 233, 242–51 (1936).
91. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (validating the
NAACP’s claim that a state statutory ban on improper solicitation of legal
business abridged “the freedoms of the First Amendment, protected against
state action by the Fourteenth”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (validating the NAACP’s freedom of association and noting that “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
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and continued to extend speech and press rights to media cor92
porations such as The New York Times. The cases involving
media corporations paid little attention to the corporate identity of the parties, but rather emphasized the purpose the press
93
serves “as a vital source of public information.” The NAACP
cases relied heavily on the associational nature of the particular corporation, which was understood as engaging in “coopera94
tive, organizational activity” and asserting the rights of its
95
members rather than having personhood of its own.
Following this recognition of constitutional protections for
media corporations and nonprofit membership corporations
came the Court’s extension of First Amendment protections to
96
corporations through the commercial speech doctrine and in
97
the context of corporate political spending. This period from
the 1970s to the present has represented a significant expansion of constitutional protections for ordinary business corporations, as the Court has come to see them as capable of asserting
rights to participate in the marketplace of ideas and as a source
98
of information that is useful to consumers. While these decisions are subject to important criticism on a number of
grounds, for the purposes at hand we can observe that the
Court has continued to rely on the associational rationale in extending rights to corporations, deriving rights for corporations
from those of its members or participants, in addition to depending on the rights of consumers and listeners in hearing the
99
speech or information of the corporation. The commercial
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech”).
92. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
93. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250; see also id. at 243 (emphasizing the importance of “the natural right of the members of an organized society, united
for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their common
interests”); id. at 245–51 (discussing the history and importance of freedom of
press).
94. Button, 371 U.S. at 430.
95. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 458.
96. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
97. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
98. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 25, (manuscript at 40–50) for further
analysis of the Court’s notable expansion of constitutional protections for
business corporations from this period.
99. See id. (manuscript at 35–54); Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Per-
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speech cases, for instance, are grounded in consumers’ right to
100
receive information, and corporate political spending cases
refer to corporations as “associations” and “associations of citizens,” as in Citizens United v. FEC, and base their reasoning in
101
large part on the rights of listeners.
B. METHOD FOR DETERMINING CORPORATE RIGHTS
As we have seen, the Court has confronted issues concerning the applicability and scope of constitutional protections for
corporations for over two hundred years. In all of this time, it
has failed to articulate a test or standard approach for its rulings. Sometimes the Court has looked to the purpose and history of the right at issue to determine whether to accord it to a
corporation, while at other times the Court simply accorded a
right to corporations without explanation or in a conclusory
102
oral remark. Often the Court’s reasoning reflects a concept of
the corporation—as a concession from the state, as an aggregate of people, or as a real entity—that seemingly justifies the
grant or denial of the right. None of these conceptions of the
corporation succeed, however, in both accurately describing the
wide range of modern corporations and justifying why corpora103
tions would hold rights.
sonhood, and the Corporation in Politics (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 3–5) (on file with author).
100. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–65.
101. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900, 904, 907, 908 (referring to corporations as “associations” and “associations of citizens”); see id. at 900 (“Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First
Amendment seeks to foster. The Court has thus rejected the argument that
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not
natural persons.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (“It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech
comes from a corporation rather than an individual.”).
102. For discussions of the Supreme Court’s various approaches to determining the scope of corporate rights, see Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 629
(1990); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 908–30
(2011); Pollman, supra note 77, at 1635–61.
103. For further discussion of these conceptions of the corporation and the
difficulty of using them as a justification for determining the scope of corporate rights, see Pollman, supra note 77. For an argument that corporate constitutional rights should be determined with reference to the Article III standing doctrine, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of
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In addition, the so-called doctrine of corporate personhood
does not provide guidance for determining the scope of corpo104
rate rights. Contrary to public belief, the Court’s jurisprudence extending constitutional protections to corporations does
not do so on the basis that corporations themselves, as legal entities, are like natural persons. Rather, the doctrine of corporate personhood merely stands for the principle that a corporation can be accorded protections in order to protect the rights of
105
the individuals associated through the corporate form. It does
not provide a method for determining the scope of protections—
that is, the doctrine does not instruct courts to formalistically
apply the legal conclusion that the corporation is a “person” as
a mode of reasoning. The Ninth Circuit made this mistake in
Fleck, reasoning that corporations have no constitutional right
to privacy because corporations are not the type of creature
that has privacy; they are not “self-defining autonomous creatures worthy of respect and dignity” and they have no “private
106
lives.” To be sure, if we define privacy as autonomy or liberty
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330972.
104. E.g., PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE,
1874–1888 124 (2010) (“The standard interpretation today is that the Santa
Clara case established a doctrine of corporate personhood that eventually gave
corporations most of the rights held by natural persons.”); Adam Winker, Yes,
Corporations Are People, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/corporations_are_
people_and_that_s_why_hobby_lobby_should_lose_at_the_supreme.html (noting popular misunderstanding of corporate personhood). For an example of
common phrasing in the media, see Adam Schiff, The Supreme Court Still
Thinks Corporations Are People, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2012, 3:11 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-supreme-court-still
-thinks-corporations-are-people/259995 (noting the Court concluded in Citizens
United that “corporations are people—at least as far as the First Amendment
is concerned”).
105. See KENS, supra note 104, at 124; see also Blair & Pollman, supra note
25. The discussion of rights in this Article focuses on the treatment of corporations under the Constitution, not the separate topic of the status of corporations as legal entities with the ability to do certain things such as hold property, contract, sue and be sued, and the policy of limited liability. For a
discussion of the distinction between corporate constitutional rights and the
entity status or legal personality of corporations, see Pollman, supra note 77,
at 1638–39.
106. See Fleck & Assocs. v. City of Phx., 471 F.3d 1100, 1105 (2006). Likewise, in considering whether corporations may claim the “personal privacy”
exemption under FOIA, the Supreme Court similarly noted that “[personal
privacy] suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort
usually associated with an entity like, say, AT&T.” FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 1177, 1183 (2011). Notably, that case did not call upon the Court “to pass
on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of constitutional
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in intimate human decisions or activities and we look at the
corporation only as an artificial entity, not representing human
interests, it would follow that the corporation is not an apt privacy right holder—corporations have no soul, they cannot engage in sexual activity, etc. But this misses the mark. This
formalistic reasoning is divorced from the reason corporations
receive rights in the first instance. As Part II.A above has
shown, corporations do not receive rights because the characteristics of the entity so closely resemble a natural human so as
to merit granting the right; rather corporations receive rights
because, as forms of organizing human enterprise, they have
natural persons involved in them, and sometimes it is necessary to accord protection to the corporation to protect their in107
terests.
Perhaps the closest the Court has come to providing a corporate rights test was in a footnote in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, in which the Court stated that it examines
whether a right is “purely personal” in determining whether it
applies to corporations:
Certain “purely personal” guarantees, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and
other organizations because the “historic function” of the particular
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether
or not a particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to
or common law,” but it nonetheless reflects the potential for unmeasured reasoning based on the likeness between corporations and humans. Id. at 1179.
Scholars have also suggested this line of thinking when discussing corporate
rights. See, e.g., STEVENSON, supra note 12, at 51 (“Corporations—and other
organizations—can make no direct claim to the benefits of those social and legal rules, for their fictional ‘personalities’ do not partake of the characteristics
wherein the rules find their basis.”); id. at 69 (“As a jurist with a sense of humor once put it, ‘[I]f you don’t have any privates, you’re not entitled to any privacy.’”).
107. The notion that the corporation holds a right to protect human interests has led some to term corporate rights as “derivative.” Meir Dan-Cohen
has, for example, explained that a derivative right serves “to safeguard or enhance the enjoyment of certain rights by others.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms
of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations,
Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1991); see MEIR
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 58–60 (1986) (“A may
have a right because of either of two reasons. A right may be recognized in A
out of concern for A himself. In such a case, A has an original right. A right in
A may also result from a concern not for him but for B. In this case, A will be
said to have a derivative right.”); cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 143 (1995) (“It follows, for example, from the fact that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than a
creature of state law, that personal rights in the Constitution should be applied to individuals connected with the firm rather than to the firm itself.”).

POLLMAN_4fmt

2014]

11/6/2014 3:54 PM

CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

53

corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history,
108
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.

The Court has not consistently used this approach or shown
that it would be possible to do so in the context of corporations.
First, the Court has not explained what it means by a “purely
personal” right. Further, basing the determination of whether a
right is “purely personal” on the “historic function” of the guarantee is problematic insofar as the Court has not consistently
109
done this in the past, and, in instances where the Court or
individual justices have looked to history, widely varying historical narratives have been given about the founders’ views of
110
corporations and their rights.
Although the Court has failed to articulate one, a
consistent framework for analyzing corporate claims to
constitutional protections is possible. We can follow the
underlying logic of the Court’s jurisprudence, set out above in
II.A, and read the Bellotti footnote in a consistent light. The
notion of a “purely personal” right can thus be understood as
referring to whether a right can be held in association or
derivatively. As the Court explained when it refused to extend
a corporation the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, that right inheres only in an individual in his or
111
her individual capacity. It is simply not the type of right that
can be exercised in association with others or asserted
derivatively. Another example of such a right would be the
right to vote. It is only meant to inhere in an individual acting

108. 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (citation omitted); see also BrowningFerris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253, 256 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing the Court did not look
to the historic function of the Fourteenth Amendment when it “converted an
amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an amendment whose major effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights
of corporations”).
110. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (acknowledging that “[t]he Framers may not have anticipated modern business and media
corporations”); cf. id. at 925–26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that despite
small numbers the corporation was “a familiar figure in [early] American economic life,” and that it is unclear that corporations were “despised” and that
the Framers would have excluded them from the First Amendment even if
they were despised (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 948–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers “conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it,” and understood corporations as being subject
to “comprehensive[] regulat[ion] in the service of the public welfare”).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89.
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in his or her individual capacity and it cannot be asserted as a
right by another. By contrast, corporate rights are, by their
112
nature, derivative and instrumental. Incorporation creates a
separate legal identity. Rights do not originate in corporations
qua corporations. They are accorded to corporations only when
necessary to protect the rights of natural persons involved in
the corporation, or on an instrumental basis to protect the
rights of other persons affected as listeners or consumers. The
Court has at times lost sight of this logic and its limits, but it
is, at core, on this basis that a bank was treated as a “citizen” of
a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the corporate
charter of a private college may be protected under the
Contract Clause, and the NAACP has a claim to freedom of
113
association.
Thus, this Article asserts that in determining whether to
accord a right to a corporation, we must look to whether the
purpose of the right is served by according it to the corporation
in question—that is, whether it is necessary to protect natural
persons—and if the right is of a type that inheres only in an
114
individual in his or her individual capacity. This requires
analyzing the purpose of the right and the natural persons
involved in the corporation. Furthermore, the derivative nature
of rights for corporations requires paying attention to
distinctions between different corporations because not all can
be fairly regarded as representing any particular natural
person or group of natural persons from whom rights can be
115
derived.
III. A CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
With the problem and methodology now framed, we turn to
whether corporations should have a constitutional right to privacy. This analysis begins by examining the purpose and nature of the right to privacy, to the extent this can be gleaned
112. Blair & Pollman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1).
113. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these and other corporate rights
cases decided by the Supreme Court.
114. For a more detailed discussion of the merits of this approach, see
Pollman, supra note 77. See also Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory
of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2013). Notably, this approach addresses the preliminary inquiry for rights determinations—whether corporations hold that particular right at all; it does not answer under what circumstances or level of scrutiny a countervailing interest
might prevail.
115. Blair & Pollman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1).
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from Supreme Court jurisprudence and scholarly conceptions.
The challenge, then, is to better understand whether the purpose (or purposes) of the right to privacy would be served by according it to corporations and whether privacy is a right that
inheres only in an individual capacity.
A. THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The notion of privacy has long factored into constitutional
adjudication as a value protected by various provisions of the
116
Constitution, including, for example, the Fourth Amendment,
117
which turns on a reasonable expectation of privacy test. But
it was not until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut that the Supreme Court announced an independent constitutional right to
118
privacy. The Court famously found the right in the “zones of
privacy” or “penumbras” of several guarantees in the Bill of
Rights, “formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
119
give them life and substance.” The Court specifically identified the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as
120
guarantees that create zones of privacy.
After Griswold, a trickle rather than a torrent of other Supreme Court privacy cases have followed. The relatively small
number and uniqueness of these cases have made the area difficult to generalize. The Court itself has sorted the cases and
the interests acknowledged therein as forming two branches:
121
decisional privacy and informational privacy.
The decisional privacy cases, or what might be categorized
as privacy cases concerning autonomy in decisions or actions,
include the right of persons to be free from government intrusions in areas of reproductive freedom, sexuality, and family relationships. This line of cases includes the widely known,
landmark decisions of Griswold (striking down a state law that
122
prohibited use of contraceptives), Roe v. Wade (disallowing
116. See, e.g., FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY:
TORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 153–55 (2009).

THE 400-YEAR HIS-

117. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 503, 504 (2007).
118. 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
119. Id. Justice Goldberg’s concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, advanced the Ninth Amendment as a source of authority for
privacy rights, absent an express reference to privacy in other provisions. Id.
at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 484 (majority opinion).
121. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
122. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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123

many restrictions on abortion), and Lawrence v. Texas (invalidating a state law criminalizing certain sexual conduct by per124
sons of the same sex).
On the whole, these cases have provided a rather murky
view of the purpose of the right to privacy. It is unclear whether a proper understanding would draw the line narrowly
around particular areas or activities, such as the right of privacy in sexual relations, or more broadly to encompass a more in125
clusive, vague notion like personal or fundamental liberty.
The latter view arguably finds support in the fact that since
Griswold the Court has grounded privacy cases in the Equal
Protection Clause and the right to liberty under the Due Pro126
cess Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The other branch, a right to informational privacy or nondisclosure of personal information, occupies a precarious position as the Supreme Court has only assumed without deciding
that the right exists, and a party has never prevailed on that
127
claim in the Supreme Court. This line of cases started in 1977
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). For other cases protecting the right to make autonomous decisions, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (plurality opinion) (abortion); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
(marriage by prisoners); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (use of contraceptives by minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by single people); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of pornography within one’s home); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage). For cases discussing privacy
that predate the Court’s recognition of an independent privacy right, see
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944) (acknowledging the
“private realm of family life”); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing the forced sterilization of convicts as the deprivation of a basic liberty); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (discussing the freedom to decide how to educate one’s children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting the freedom to educate one’s children
in different languages).
125. Some scholars have questioned whether these cases are best understood as presenting privacy harms in the first instance. See, e.g., Calo, supra
note 26, at 1137.
126. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–76 (discussing privacy case law history).
127. Lower courts have more significantly developed the jurisprudence on a
right to nondisclosure of information. The majority of circuit courts have recognized that the Constitution does provide some protection against the disclosure of private information. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307
F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th
Cir. 1995); James v. City of Douglas, Ga., 941 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Barry v. City of
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with Whalen v. Roe, marking the first time the Court suggested
that a constitutional right to privacy includes a right to avoid
128
disclosure of information. In Whalen, patients claimed that a
New York statute authorizing the state to collect the names
and addresses of people prescribed dangerous drugs had violat129
ed their privacy. The information collected was stored in a
central computer file and only a small number of public health
130
officials had access to the information. In discussing the privacy claim, the Court observed that “[t]he cases sometimes
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’” actually concerned “at
least two different kinds of interests”: an interest in “making
certain kinds of important decisions” without government interference and an “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
131
matters.” The patients claimed that the state statute threatened to impair both their interest in making health care deci132
sions and in nondisclosure of information.
While the Court recognized that a duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures of data collected and used for public purposes “arguably has its roots in the Constitution,” the Court concluded that the statute in question did not violate “any right or
133
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court
relied on the statute being “manifestly the product of an orderly
and rational legislative decision” regarding the state’s interest
in controlling distribution of dangerous drugs and on the statute containing provisions for securely maintaining the infor134
mation and preventing its public disclosure.
After Whalen, the Court again referred to a right to nondisclosure of information in Nixon v. Administrator of General
135
Services. There, the Court upheld the Presidential Recordings
New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Denver Policemen’s Protective
Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981); Fadjo v. Coon, 633
F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,
AFL–CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“The Supreme Court has addressed the issue in recurring dicta without, we
believe, resolving it.”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088–90 (6th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information).
128. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
129. See id. at 591.
130. Id. at 593–95.
131. Id. at 598–600.
132. Id. at 600.
133. Id. at 605–06.
134. Id. at 597–605.
135. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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and Materials Preservation Act, under which President Nixon
was forced to turn over his official records for archivists to
screen them, returning to him materials that were “personal
and private in nature” and determining terms and conditions
136
for eventual public access to the other materials.
Nixon had challenged the Act’s constitutionality based in
part on his right to privacy in the materials under the First,
137
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Court acknowledged the
138
privacy interest in nondisclosure, citing Whalen, and Nixon’s
“legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communica139
tions,” but concluded his privacy interests were outweighed in
the circumstances by the public’s interest in the documents and
140
by his status as a public figure. The Court also noted that his
claim related “only to a very small fraction of the massive volume of official materials with which they [were] . . . commin141
gled”; thus Nixon lacked an expectation of privacy in the majority of the materials. Also weighing against his claim was the
fact that segregating the materials without screening was a
“virtual impossibility,” and the Act provided procedures to min142
imize the intrusion. Although the Court did not find a meritorious claim in Nixon’s case, the Court’s balancing approach
gave credence to a privacy right in nondisclosure.
143
In 2011, in NASA v. Nelson, the Supreme Court recalled
the Whalen and Nixon line of cases, but again held there was
no violation of a constitutional right to privacy in the case at
hand. Contract employees at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory
claimed that two parts of forms used for background checks violated their right to informational privacy—specifically, a section of a form that asked employees about treatment or counseling for recent illegal drug use and certain open-ended
144
questions on a form sent to the employee’s references.
136. Id. at 429–30.
137. Id. at 455.
138. Id. at 457 (“One element of privacy has been characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . .’” (quoting
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599)).
139. Id. at 465.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 459.
142. Id. at 465 (noting the “unblemished record of the archivists for discretion”).
143. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
144. Id. at 752–53 (detailing one form that asked if the reference had “any
reason to question the employee’s honesty or trustworthiness,” and if the ref-
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In discussing the claimed privacy right, the Court
acknowledged that “[i]n two cases decided more than 30 years
ago, this Court referred broadly to a constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’” and had since
145
“said little else on the subject.” While many lower courts had
146
addressed the issue in the interim, the Court acknowledged
that its own case law had been sparse: “[a] few opinions have
mentioned the concept in passing and in other contexts, [b]ut
no other decision has squarely addressed a constitutional right
147
to informational privacy.” The Court then assumed without
deciding that “the Constitution protects a privacy right of the
sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon”—and held that “whatever the scope of this interest,” the challenged portions of the
government background check, subject to the Privacy Act’s
safeguards against public disclosure and as part of the government’s reasonable management of its internal affairs as em148
ployer, did not violate that right. Perhaps because the Court
has “proceed[ed] with caution” where it has only “scarce and
open-ended guideposts of substantive due process to show [it]
149
the way,” the Court has left open the broader issues concerning informational privacy and its purpose. As Justice Scalia
lamented, by repeatedly assuming the right without deciding it,
“the Court actually applies a constitutional informational privacy standard without giving a clue as to the rule of law it is
150
applying.”
Scholarly conceptions of privacy have added depth and context that aid in understanding the values or purpose being
served in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence. One mapping of
erence had “any adverse information concerning the employee’s violations of
the law, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol and/or drugs, mental or emotional
stability, general behavior, or conduct or other matters” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. Id. at 751, 756 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977);
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457)).
146. Id. at 756 n.9 (“Many courts hold that disclosure of at least some kinds
of personal information should be subject to a test that balances the government’s interests against the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure. The
Sixth Circuit has held that the right to informational privacy protects only intrusions upon interests that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. The D.C. Circuit has expressed grave doubts about
the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra note 127.
147. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 751, 756–57.
149. Id. at 757 n.10 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring).

POLLMAN_4fmt

60

11/6/2014 3:54 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:27

privacy literature, from Daniel Solove, identifies six general
types or understandings of privacy, with some overlap: (1) a
right to be let alone (Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s influential formulation); (2) limited access to self; (3) secrecy or
concealment of certain matters; (4) control over personal information or information about oneself; (5) personhood (protection
151
of one’s personality, individuality, dignity); and (6) intimacy.
Another categorization, from Helen Nissenbaum, identifies two
common approaches in the literature: privacy as a constraint
152
on access and privacy as a form of control. One might understand these approaches as corresponding to, or supporting, an
interest in the nondisclosure of information and an interest in
decisional autonomy, which serve various values such as liberty, selfhood, democracy, innovation, space for intimate rela153
tions, and social welfare. The idea driving many of these
identified values is that privacy allows people to explore, innovate, and make personal choices in a certain sphere to which
they control access and without fear that they might be viewed
as unconventional or unpopular and face reprisals, ridicule, or
154
denial of benefits.
A few scholars have conceived of privacy in a way that explicitly includes groups or organizations, either envisioning
group privacy as an analogue to individual privacy or an extension of it. Alan Westin’s definition notably included the privacy
151. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 13. Solove has argued that these conceptions are each either too narrow or too broad because of their failure to include
or exclude matters we typically view as private. Id. at 37. Solove has thus
tried to shift focus away from the term “privacy” and instead toward specific
activities that pose privacy problems, taking a pluralistic approach rather
than searching for a unified concept based on core characteristics. Id. at 39–
40.
152. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 69–70 (2010); see also ALLEN, supra note
13, at 34 (blending ideas of the access and control views); WESTIN, supra note
20, at 7 (illustrating the control view by defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others”); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (illustrating the access view by defining privacy as relating to “our concern over our
accessibility to others”).
153. E.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 152, at 74–75; SOLOVE, supra note 13,
at 12, 78–80, 98.
154. NISSENBAUM, supra note 152, at 75, 77. Some scholars like Solove
contend, however, that as a descriptive matter, there is no unitary or overarching value that privacy law protects; rather, “[t]he value of privacy in a
particular context depends upon the social importance of the activities it facilitates.” SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 10, 98.
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155

of “individuals, groups, or institutions.” He viewed privacy in
terms of social limitation or control and argued that, like individuals, organizations have a parallel need to “decide when and
to what extent their acts and decisions should be made pub156
lic.” Westin argued that organizational privacy is more than
“the collective privacy rights of the members as individuals”
and that it is required to enable groups to “play the role of independent and responsible agents . . . in democratic societies,”
such as fulfilling needs for affiliation, group expression, operation of private enterprise, and criticism of government poli157
cies.
Edward Bloustein subsequently identified a need to develop a theoretical framework of group privacy, which he referred
158
to as the “‘right to huddle.’” Bloustein’s seminal work, Individual & Group Privacy, attempted to provide such a framework by discussing the marital relationship, lawyer-client relationships, the physician-patient privilege, political and social
organizations, business organizations, and governmental or159
ganizations. According to Bloustein, group privacy is an extension of individual privacy—protecting individuals’ need to
160
come together and act in concert to attain their objectives.
“‘Group privacy’ is an attribute of individuals in association
155. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 7.
156. Id. at 42.
157. Id.
158. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 123. Some sociologists have also defined
privacy to include groups. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 196
(1999) (privacy is “the realm in which an actor (either a person or a group,
such as a couple) can legitimately act without disclosure and accountability to
others”); SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 23; Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 71, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1971) (“We become what we are not only by establishing
boundaries around ourselves but also by a periodic opening of these boundaries to nourishment, to learning, and to intimacy. But the opening of a boundary of the self may require a boundary farther out, a boundary around the
group to which we are opening ourselves.”); Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy,
in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra at 149.
159. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 123–86 (discussing the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, trade secret law, and statutory protections such as the trade
secret exemption of FOIA, to identify the underlying principles that corporations constitute a barrier to statism and must be able to maintain trade secrets to compete with each other, and that many statutes requiring disclosure
invade group privacy in the interest of protecting the public).
160. Id. at 125. “The right to be let alone protects the integrity and the dignity of the individual. The right to associate with others in confidence—the
right of privacy in one’s associations—assures the success and integrity of the
group purpose.” Id. at 181.
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with one another within a group, rather than an attribute of
161
the group itself.”
Neither Westin nor Bloustein specifically analyzed whether corporations could claim a right to privacy under the U.S.
Constitution. But their work is foundational in describing
group privacy and explaining that it serves multiple functions.
It can serve to vindicate the privacy interests of individuals
that exist without regard to their relationship to the organization, or to vindicate privacy interests of individuals that relate
to the existence of the organization. Presumably, a group right
to privacy may also serve a mixture of these functions—
protecting a religious organization, for example, might protect
each member’s privacy in free exercise as well as protecting
members’ privacy in pursuing this activity in collective form.
In sum, while the Supreme Court and the privacy literature have not coalesced around a singular definition of privacy
or its purpose, the Court has identified two privacy interests—
an interest in making certain decisions without government interference and an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information—and we can understand these as informed by the
values that privacy scholars have identified and the notion that
group privacy may protect privacy in one’s associations in an
individual and collective sense.
B. SHOULD THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY EXTEND TO CORPORATIONS?
The next analytical step is to examine whether it would
serve the purpose of the privacy right to provide it to corporations. To be consistent with the fundamental rationale for extending corporations rights, as discussed in Part II.A, this requires an understanding of corporate dynamics and the
participants involved in the corporation, rather than a reified
162
concept or metaphor for the corporation. This keeps the focus
on carrying out the purpose of the right and granting a corporate right only when it would actually protect human inter163
ests.

161. Id. at 124.
162. See supra Part II; see also Pollman, supra note 77.
163. For a discussion of reification versus decomposing the firm into various participant groups, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE 117–18 (2010) (“[R]eification is a device for making something
that is in fact complex seem simple, and that can be dangerous. In reality, only
individuals enjoy the benefits, or bear the burdens and the responsibilities, of
actions affecting other individuals.”).

POLLMAN_4fmt

2014]

11/6/2014 3:54 PM

CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

63

As soon as one opens the hood to look at the corporation,
one confronts the reality that corporations come in a variety of
types, not necessarily resembling each other. Coca-Cola, The
New York Times, the American Civil Liberties Union, a small
family-run company, a church, and a small charity group are
all, or might be, corporations. Line drawing between corporations is a challenge the Supreme Court has often avoided or re164
fused, such as in Citizens United v. FEC, but the significant
variation in the purpose and dynamics of corporations necessitates more nuanced analysis because the purpose of a constitutional right may not be served by according it to all corporations.
Given this significant variation between corporations and
the need for an organizing schema, this section divides its
analysis between (1) public corporations and (2) private and
nonprofit corporations. This organization is not meant to suggest that any of these categories should be broadly accorded
rights. Rather it reflects a rough, but potentially meaningful
way of starting the analysis. It separates public corporations,
which generally have a business purpose and thousands of people involved in distinct roles, from nonprofit and private corporations, which may have more wide-ranging purposes, sizes,
and roles. Further, in this latter category of private and nonprofit corporations, the connection between the individuals and
the corporation may be much closer than in the case of public
corporations, the dynamics may resemble an association, and
the purpose of the corporation may be more likely to implicate
165
privacy values. Thus, each section below analyzes the corporate dynamics and participants involved in the type of corporation—public, private or nonprofit—to determine whether any
164. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (ruling broadly as to
all corporations).
165. Regarding the terminology of this categorization, all states recognize
that corporations may be for-profit or nonprofit. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2024 (2007). Within the for-profit category, corporations may be public or private. The line between these is generally understood as referring to whether the company is
publicly reporting under federal securities regulations—not to whether, in a
theoretical sense, the corporation has public or private dimensions. See, e.g.,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2012) (defining
when an issuer of securities must register such securities with the Securities
and Exchange Commission); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2014) (defining when an
issuer of securities is exempt from the registration requirement of section
12(g)); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 106 (referring to “‘public’ corporations—that is, large firms with many shareholders and with active trading of
shares”).
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people likely have a privacy interest at stake and whether the
purpose of the privacy right would be served by derivatively ac166
cording it to the corporation.
1. Public Corporations
Public corporations have shareholders, directors and officers, as well as other stakeholders, such as employees and customers. As explained below, there is little possibility of a cognizable privacy interest at stake that would justify granting
public corporations a constitutional right to privacy.
a. Shareholders
The privacy interests of shareholders in public corporations
are not likely implicated by disclosures of corporate information
or the decisions or activities the corporation engages in. The
reasons for this are in the very nature of the relationship between shareholders, managers, and the public corporation.
Public corporations have large-scale, dispersed, passive in167
vestment. Corporate assets are held by the corporation, not
168
the shareholders. Stock ownership provides limited rights.
Shareholders have the right to the residual interest in the firm
and they have certain voting rights—the right to elect the
board of directors and to vote on a few fundamental issues,
169
such as merger or dissolution. Although corporate scholars
166. Looking at the categories of participants involved in the corporation is
a way to systematically analyze in a theoretical setting whether any people
behind the corporation have privacy interests at stake. It is not meant to reify
the categories themselves or suggest an exact equivalence between the corporation’s interests and the interests of each of its individual participants in all
respects. Cf. DAN-COHEN, supra note 107, at 64 (“[T]he organization serves as
a kind of ‘moral buffer’: harming the organization is not exhaustively reducible
to the harming of particular individuals.”).
167. For a classic work documenting the shift by the early twentieth century of shareholders from owners to passive investors, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
1–7 (1932).
168. Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 391
(2003). Economists and corporate law scholars have argued that shareholders
cannot meaningfully be conceived of as “owners” of the firm as they own stock,
not the corporation itself. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 (1980); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and NotSo-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191
(2002).
169. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 11, 288–89
(1996) (stating that voting “is not to provide a means for conveying the patrons’ preferences to the firm’s management, but rather to make it more diffi-
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have long debated the locus of power in a firm, as a practical
matter it is uncontroversial that shareholders do not have effective control of the operations of the firm or authority to act
on behalf of the corporation; management authority is statuto170
rily vested in the board.
In light of these basic premises, shareholders of public corporations do not expect to be active participants in the busi171
ness. In fact, shareholders are often too dispersed and numerous to exercise even their limited voting rights in a
172
Further, public companies have liquid
meaningful way.
shares and shareholders may exit; share ownership may be
173
short-term. As such, public corporations cannot be identified
with a single, lasting group of individual shareholders. Moreover, many shareholders are actually organizations—
institutional investors such as banks, pension funds, mutual
174
funds, etc. Individual claimants whose money is invested are
second-order investors and commonly have diversified portfoli175
os. These individuals might not even disclose their names to
the companies, whose registers would show the stock as held by
176
the organization.
In this way, one would expect most shareholders to be unattached to the public corporation except as to an indirect and
often diversified economic interest. One way of thinking about
this might be through the lens of the “shareholder wealth maximization norm,” which maintains that the purpose of the firm
is to maximize shareholder wealth and shareholders are generally assumed to have a homogenous economic interest in the
177
firm. Under this view, shareholders would only care about
cult for the firm to exploit those patrons as a class . . . . [t]o give the electorate
some crude protection from gross opportunism on the part of those in power.”).
170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014); see also KLEIN ET AL., supra
note 163, at 110, 123.
171. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 106.
172. HANSMANN, supra note 169, at 11.
173. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 109 no. 6.
174. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447–51 (1991) (discussing the rise of institutional investors).
175. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879–83 (2010) (“Most institutional investors are highly diversified, enabling them to reduce or eliminate
the effect of firm-specific risk on their overall returns.”).
176. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1236–38 (2008).
177. HANSMANN, supra note 169, at 288 (“[I]n virtually all cases the group
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corporate disclosures that resulted in economic harm to the
firm, and their concerns would be solely economic in nature. As
the purpose of a constitutional privacy right is not to serve such
an economic function, shareholders’ privacy interests would not
be implicated in public corporations or by corporate actions.
And, even if one were to take a different view—that shareholders do not have homogenous interests in the public corporation and its purpose is not shareholder wealth maximization—the fact would still remain that corporate law does not
treat shareholders as “owners” or “principals” with the ability
178
to control corporate operations, and shareholders have limited opportunities for participating in public corporations in a
way that might implicate their privacy interests.
More specifically, as far as information flows, because
shareholders are not active participants in the business, they
typically do not provide or create information in their limited
involvement that would implicate privacy interests. Shareholders may vote on particular matters and thus may transmit
their decisions on those issues, but they are not of a personal or
intimate nature. This would typically be as straightforward as
a “yea” or “nay” vote on a fundamental corporate change, such
as a merger or the election of the board of directors. Shareholders could also submit a proposal for a particular corporate action to be voted on with the company’s proxy materials if the
179
Common topics for
proposal meets certain requirements.
shareholder proposals are changes to corporate governance,
such as majority voting, or corporate social responsibility is180
sues, such as human rights. Even if a shareholder bought
stock to try to advance a social or political purpose, however,
the shareholder would still typically be an organization such as
PETA or an institutional investor and the goal would generally
be to raise public awareness and thereby pressure corporate
181
management, not to keep the proposal private.

of individuals to whom ownership is given is extremely homogenous in its interests.”).
178. See Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 11 (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-04, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1763944.
179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014).
180. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1761, 1769–70 (2011).
181. Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1355, 1368 (2010).
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The only situation of shareholder interaction that might
implicate privacy interests would be “behind-the-scenes”
shareholder activism. This scenario typically involves an institutional investor making a shareholder proposal and engaging
182
in private negotiations with corporate management. In a
sense, the interaction resembles Bloustein’s description of
group privacy as protecting a need to come together and act in
183
concert to attain group objectives. Yet, the shareholder in this
184
instance is usually an institutional investor, and one would
be hard-pressed to locate a human involved with any awareness of a privacy interest at stake. Further, it is common practice for corporations to consult the SEC concerning whether
proposals may be excluded from the corporate proxy. Thus,
while the shareholder might seek confidential negotiations to
further group objectives, the shareholder would not reasonably
expect privacy given that the corporation itself, as represented
by directors or officers, might voluntarily disclose information
185
concerning the interaction to the government.
Thus, in view of the very limited opportunities for participation and information exchange, it is highly unlikely that public company shareholders would create or be privy to information of a type that would implicate privacy protection.
b. Directors and Officers
Directors and officers present a somewhat closer ques186
tion. Both directors and executive officers make high-level de182. Id.; see also Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on
Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAACREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335 (1998) (reviewing private negotiations between
TIAA-CREF and firms in its portfolio during the 1992–1996 period).
183. See BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 140–46.
184. Shareholder Activism, ROCK CTR. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Apr.
28, 2012), https://rockcenter.law.stanford.edu/videos/shareholder-activism
(providing a detailed account of shareholder activism and the institutional investors who are involved).
185. Regarding information flow in the other direction, shareholders receive information that is widely disseminated in the public markets, and
shareholders generally have the right under state corporation codes to investigate the corporation’s records for a “proper purpose.” See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220 (2014), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/index.shtml.
Proper purposes for investigation are limited to those related to the shareholders’ interest in the firm. Id. Again, this is unlikely to implicate shareholder privacy interests.
186. Many directors and officers are, of course, also shareholders; this
analysis considers privacy interests rooted in their primary role as directors or
officers.
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cisions for the corporation and have information about them187
selves made public. The public disclosure of director and executive names, ages, employment history, and in some instances compensation packages, is mandated by federal securities
188
regulations. In addition to specific line-item disclosure requirements, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 include “gap-filling” rules that require the
disclosure of any further “material” information necessary to
189
make the required statements not misleading. Underlying
these disclosure obligations is a policy concern for protecting
190
investors and promoting market integrity.
While most of the information disclosed about officers and
directors is not of the type that would likely implicate a privacy
191
right, one potential exception to this is the disclosure of director or officer health information. This example made media
headlines in recent years with news of Steve Jobs’s health and
questions about whether Apple Inc. had to disclose otherwise
private health information regarding its board member and
192
chief executive officer. Jobs was not the only example in this

187. For a discussion of the roles of directors and officers, see KLEIN ET AL.,
supra note 163, at 116, 135–37; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797, 801–04 (2001).
188. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (requiring corporations to disclose additional information regarding executive compensation in their annual proxy statement);
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401–404 (2013). Other information about executives that
must be publicly disclosed includes involvements in bankruptcy proceedings
and criminal convictions. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About
Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures To Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 755–59 (2007).
189. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20 (2013).
190. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479–80, 480 n.25
(2007); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983). For criticism of mandatory disclosure,
see, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692–96 (1984).
191. See Victoria L. Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 496–97, 497 n.34 (noting the distinction between loss
of privacy and infringement upon a right to privacy).
192. For an argument that the SEC should impose a rule requiring disclosure of medical information about a “luminary” that is material to the corporation, see Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill:
When Is a Corporation Obligated To Disclose that Illness and Should the Secu-
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regard; other instances of a key executive falling ill have raised
193
the same issue of whether it must be publicly disclosed.
Google co-founder Sergey Brin has even preemptively announced that he has a gene mutation that increases his likeli194
hood of contracting Parkinson’s disease.
To date, the SEC has not provided specific guidance about
whether and when disclosures of executives’ personal health
conditions are required, and commentators’ views on this topic
195
have varied. The key determination is whether the information is “material”—that is, whether “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance”
196
to the information in making an investment decision. A court
could find that personal information about an executive is material, such as a serious illness that would affect their ability to
197
do their job. Scholars have also discussed the possibility that
other personal information could be material due to its impact
on an executive’s job performance or because it reflects an executive’s integrity and values such as “a possible criminal pros198
ecution,” “a messy divorce, extramarital affairs, legal difficul199
ties, addictions, and various problems with a child.” Further,
where an executive is iconic or has a reputation especially tied
to the corporate brand, personal facts about that executive are

rities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 827 (2009).
193. See id. at 829–30 (discussing instances involving the CEOs of Time
Warner, Inc., McDonald’s Corp., Kraft Foods, Inc., and Bear Stearns & Co.).
194. Miguel Helft, Google Co-founder Has Genetic Code Linked to Parkinson’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/
technology/19google.html.
195. For academic proposals on this topic, see Patricia Sánchez Abril &
Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the Intersection
of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545 (2010); Heminway, supra note 188, at 789–802; Horwich, supra note 192, at 862–70; Tom C.W. Lin,
Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2012); Tom C.W. Lin,
Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company
Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383 (2009); Schwartz, supra note 191; Alexis
Brown Stokes, An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: An Examination of a Corporate Officer’s Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Shareholders, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303 (2011).
196. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (2013); Heminway, supra note 188, at
756–57.
197. See Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307,
323–25 (1996) (discussing the potential materiality of a CEO’s serious illness);
Heminway, supra note 188, at 757 (same).
198. Heminway, supra note 188, at 759, 763.
199. Schwartz, supra note 191, at 490.
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200

more likely to be material. A few notable corporate luminaries have identities that have been particularly intertwined with
that of a public corporation, such as Bill Gates, Steve Jobs,
Martha Stewart, and Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Although the public corporation is composed of a
complex set of relationships and individuals, corporations with
luminaries like these are in the position of having individuals
201
whose reputations are directly linked to the corporate image.
Thus, the executive health example shows that a corporate
right to privacy could support cognizable human interests. That
is, if the corporation can successfully claim a privacy right, its
executives might be able to keep their health information private from the public. Protecting an executive’s personal information might help ensure that highly qualified individuals
seek executive positions and that they can work effectively,
without worries about compelled disclosure of personal infor202
mation. Further, health information conceivably fits within
various conceptions of privacy discussed above, such as the Supreme Court’s recognition of a privacy interest in the nondisclosure of information. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s first case
discussing the privacy interest in nondisclosure, Whalen, in203
volved personal health information. In denying the claim
there, the Court specifically relied on the fact that the statute
200. Heminway, supra note 188, at 763; cf. Schwartz, supra note 191, at
512–16 (providing examples of corporate disclosure and nondisclosure of executives’ personal information).
201. For instance, when Martha Stewart’s company went public, the prospectus warned investors that the corporation was “‘highly dependent’” on one
individual, Stewart, as “‘the personification of our brands as well as our senior
executive and primary creative force.’” The Cult of Personality vs. Needs of the
Market; Martha Stewart, the Company, Is Poised To Go Public. But Is It a
Good Thing?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/12/
business/cult-personality-vs-needs-market-martha-stewart-company-poised
-go-public-but-it.html. Commentators noted the company was based entirely
on Stewart and questioned whether the company would suffer severely if she
were “hit by a bus—or by a scandal.” Id. Indeed, five years later when Stewart
became embroiled in an insider trading investigation and served a ten-month
sentence for making false statements and obstructing the investigation, the
company suffered financially along with its founder’s personal legal woes. See
United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 273 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 591, 594–97 (2006) (discussing the repercussions to Stewart’s
company from the investigation of her trade and subsequent conviction).
202. Heminway, supra note 188, at 774.
203. For a discussion of Whalen, see supra text accompanying notes 128–
34.
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in question provided for securely maintaining the information,
only providing it to a small number of public health officials,
and preventing its public disclosure. That would not be the case
in the instance of executive health information because if the
SEC were to require disclosure due to the information’s materiality to the investing public it would by definition make the
information public. Furthermore, the government interest in
such a disclosure would arguably be less than it was in Whalen
where the statute concerned the state’s interest in controlling
the distribution of dangerous drugs.
The executive health example also shows why an individual may not be able to fully vindicate her privacy interests in an
individual capacity. Various laws protect some aspects of individual privacy. For instance, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) may preclude some disclosures about
204
205
health, FOIA contains a “personal privacy” exemption, and
the Privacy Act bars disclosure of records held by government
entities without the prior written consent of the individual to
206
whom the record pertains. But in circumstances where federal securities laws require corporate disclosure and this patchwork of protections does not cover the information, the individual may not be able to keep the information to herself unless
the corporation can vindicate the right. That is, requiring affected individuals to come forward in their own names would
undermine the very interest they would be trying to protect.
On the other hand, as it is the information of just one identifiable person, it is not clear that the corporation itself would
have to be accorded the right so long as it could assert the right
207
on behalf of the affected individual. Moreover, the example
also demonstrates that directors and executive officers of public
corporations are public figures, and competing interests may
exist amongst participants in the corporation that could weigh
against according the corporation a right. When people assume
certain top-ranking positions within a public corporation, they
204. See Horwich, supra note 192, at 832–33 (noting that the contours of
the conflict between the securities disclosure regime and the ADA are not well
understood).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012). Under the Court’s recent ruling, individuals but not corporations may claim the “personal privacy” exemption. FCC
v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011).
206. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). The Privacy Act does not
include the corporation in its definition of “individual.” Id. § 552a(a)(2).
207. For a discussion of third party standing and its limitations, see Garrett, supra note 103.
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know that means certain information about themselves will become public. Corporate icons like Steve Jobs are especially
identifiable as public figures, and the very reason why they
might have to disclose health information is because they are
viewed as so integral to the corporation’s success that it would
208
be considered material to a reasonable investor. Although
most directors and officers do not receive such a high level of
public attention and may not be luminaries about whom such
extensive information would be disclosed, their high-level positions in public corporations lessen their reasonable expectations of privacy in information relevant to their involvement in
209
the corporation. Further, the tension between privacy and
disclosure arises in this instance from the competing interests
of the corporate participants themselves—officers/directors and
shareholders. Disclosure generally serves shareholder interests
by promoting investor protection and market integrity. For these reasons, officers and directors present a closer question, but
would likely fail to demonstrate a cognizable constitutional privacy interest that would justify granting public corporations a
right to privacy.
c. Employees and Other Stakeholders
Employees in public corporations, apart from executive officers, are typically further from the core of the corporation’s
decision making and any critical information that might implicate privacy interests. Public corporations often employ thousands of individuals and the employee ranks change frequently.
Furthermore, in many legal contexts, employee interests
actually stand in conflict with those of the employing corporation. For instance, the privacy rights of the employee are often
set against employers’ business justifications for monitoring

208. See Horwich, supra note 192, at 827–33.
209. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law,
126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2014 (2013) (“[P]rivacy protections for people voluntarily in the public eye in the United States are basically negligible.” (citing
Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 147 (2012))); cf. Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (“In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of
the screening process, of appellant’s status as a public figure . . . .”).
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210

employees. This creates some dissonance with the idea of deriving a privacy right for corporations from their employees.
Other stakeholders in the public corporation are also in a
position too attenuated to support a derivative corporate privacy right. A stakeholder, broadly speaking, is a party that can
211
affect or be affected by the corporation’s actions. As with employees, in many legal contexts the stakeholder’s interests actually stand in conflict with those of the shareholders or directors and officers. For instance, customers are often counted as
stakeholders, and a whole area of the law deals with consumer
privacy—laws and regulations that seek to protect consumers’
loss of privacy due to failures or limitations on corporate cus212
tomer privacy measures. Consumer privacy laws recognize
that corporations sometimes have an opposing interest in shar213
ing consumer data for commercial advantage. Therefore, one
210. Corey A. Ciocchetti, Monitoring Employee E-Mail: Efficient Workplaces vs. Employee Privacy, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0026, ¶¶ 1–2 (listing examples of employer monitoring that may include surveillance of employee telephone calls, the time each employee spends on bathroom breaks, and
workplace e-mail), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1025&context=dltr; Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace:
How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
271, 271 (1996).
211. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 53 (1984) (stating that a stakeholder is “any group or individual who
can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose”).
Some would define stakeholder more narrowly, such as someone having an
asset at risk. See, e.g., Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
92, 105–07 (1995).
212. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph W. Gelb, Consumer Privacy Litigation and Enforcement Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 723 (2005); J. Howard
Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in
Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (2008). For a discussion of
corporations’ use of consumer data, see SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461 (2000).
213. As privacy scholar Neil Richards has explained:
[C]ompanies big and small generate vast fortunes from the collection,
use, and sale of personal data. . . . “[B]ehavioral advertising” is a
multibillion-dollar business, and is the foundation on which the successes of companies like Google and Facebook have been built. One
recent study concludes that this form of surveillance is so ingrained
into the fabric of the Internet “that a small number of companies have
a window into most of our movements online.”
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938
(2013) (footnote omitted). Further, “[g]overnment and nongovernment surveillance support each other in a complex manner that is often impossible to disentangle.” Id. at 1940.
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could not assume that a corporate right would protect consumers’ interests or that a corporation would assert such a right in
214
defense of its customers.
That being said, while employees’ and stakeholders’ interests often stand in conflict with those of other corporate participants, their interests may sometimes align vis-à-vis the government, and the corporation may be better situated to
vindicate those interests. For instance, when the government
subpoenaed Google to produce a list of URLs available through
its site and the text of users’ search queries, questions arose
215
about the privacy of Google’s users. The government had
sought the information to test blocking and filtering software
216
for minors. Google objected on a variety of bases, including
the potential for “loss of user trust” that would harm Google’s
217
The federal district court separately
business goodwill.
raised, sua sponte, privacy concerns about Google’s users because identifiable information may be found in text strings, and
because of the prevalence of internet searches for sexually ex218
plicit material. Ultimately, the court determined it did not
have to rule on the privacy issue in that case because it granted
the government’s motion to compel only as to the sample URLs
219
and not as to the search queries.
Similarly, in the recent case Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, Amazon disputed the North Carolina Department of Revenue’s
demand for all in-state customer sale information as part of a
220
tax investigation. Among other claims, Amazon asserted that
“the privacy and First Amendment rights of itself and of its
214. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 598, 600 (2009) (arguing that third-party business record holders
can fight for their customers’ privacy rights, but acknowledging that “third
parties in possession of business records may be willing to cooperate with the
police” and that “recent headlines about how telecommunications providers
voluntarily assisted the NSA in collecting third-party records (quite possibly
in violation of statutory privacy laws) reaffirm that sometimes third-party
providers will cooperate eagerly with the government”).
215. Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 677, 687–88 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
216. Id. at 678.
217. Id. at 683–84.
218. Id. at 687.
219. Id. at 687–88. For a discussion of applying the First Amendment in
the criminal procedure context, such as to subpoenas for book records or
search query data that implicate First Amendment activities, see Daniel J.
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
166–76 (2007).
220. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1154–55 (W.D. Wash.
2010).
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customers” would be violated by forcing it to disclose personal
221
identifiers. Represented by the ACLU, Amazon customers intervened anonymously in the suit, alleging their own First and
222
The court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
state’s request implicated the First Amendment rights of “Amazon’s customers and the Intervenors,” and the state was prohibited from forcing Amazon to disclose the identities and spe223
cific purchase information of its residents.
These cases illustrate that corporations have an important
role to play in safeguarding their customers’ privacy interests.
Further, the importance of this role is growing at a rapid pace,
with the increasing pervasiveness of corporations storing the
224
personal data of customers and users. But customers’ interests are generally too attenuated or divergent from a corporation’s to support a derivative privacy right for the corporation—
customers are outside the corporation—and so the rationale for
according the right to the corporation would have to be instru225
mental. In that regard, a parallel might be drawn to the
commercial speech doctrine. As discussed in Part II.A, the rationale for protecting commercial speech has not been to protect
the speech right of the corporation as speaker or the natural
221. Id. at 1159, 1162; Complaint for Declaratory Relief Pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 at 1, 3, Amazon.com LLC
v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664), available
at http://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/files/Amazon%20Complaint.pdf (“If Amazon is forced to comply with this demand, the disclosure will invade the privacy and violate the First Amendment rights of Amazon and its customers on
a massive scale. . . . Amazon asserts the privacy and First Amendment rights
of itself and of its customers so that Amazon may sell—and customers may
read, hear or view—a broad range of popular and unpopular expressive materials with the customers’ private content choices protected from unnecessary
government scrutiny.”).
222. Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion To Intervene and Motion To File
Complaint in Intervention Using Pseudonyms at 4, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay,
758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (2010) (No. 2:10-CV-00664).
223. Amazon.com, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1167–69. For a discussion of First
Amendment “reader privacy” and the importance of “intellectual privacy,” see
Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689 (2013).
224. See Richards, supra note 223, at 698–703; Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
320–21 (2008).
225. Thorny issues of standing could also arise. For a discussion of various
standing doctrines, see Garrett, supra note 103; Glenn D. Magpantay, Associational Rights and Standing: Does Citizens United Require Constitutional
Symmetry Between the First Amendment and Article III?, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 667 (2012); Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2003).
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persons behind the corporation, but rather to protect consumers who have an interest in hearing the information. Similarly
in the context of informational privacy, according protection to
the corporation might serve to protect the customers who face
collective action problems and who may not be willing to come
forward or even know that their personal information is at risk
226
of being disclosed. Such a basis for according protection to
corporations would be narrow, however, because it would only
exist to serve such an instrumental purpose related to customers—not a derivative right generally accorded to public corporations. At best, this might be ground for a narrow doctrine or
elaboration of the Whalen v. Roe line of cases to address these
227
concerns.
To sum up the analysis for public corporations, by looking
at the various participants involved—shareholders, directors
and officers, employees and other stakeholders—and the dynamics within the corporation, we see that there is little possibility of a cognizable privacy interest at stake that would justify granting public corporations a constitutional right to privacy.
The role of shareholders in public corporations is economic in
nature and shareholders have limited opportunities to participate and exchange information in a way that would implicate
privacy interests. Directors and officers have information about
themselves publicly disclosed, but it is only rarely of a type that
might give rise to privacy concerns of a constitutional dimension and it is not clear that the corporation itself would need a
right to privacy to vindicate the privacy right of the individual.
Further, any privacy interests of public company directors and
officers are diminished or constrained by their status as public
figures and shareholders’ competing interests. Employees and
other stakeholders are typically further from the core of the
226. An example of this dynamic might be the situation faced by the nearly
400,000 users of the company Lavabit’s encrypted e-mail service. The service
came to national attention when the government tried to compel disclosure of
its master encryption keys after it was revealed that Edward Snowden had a
Lavabit account. See Jennifer Granick, Hands Off Encryption! Say New Amici
Briefs in Lavabit Case, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2013, 12:26 PM),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/26/hands-encryption-amici-briefs-lavabit-case;
Orin Kerr, Lavabit Challenges Contempt Order in the Fourth Circuit: An
Analysis of Its Arguments, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:29 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/11/lavabit-challenges-contempt-order.
227. Existing doctrine might also constrain this possibility—most notably,
the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine provides that information loses
protection when knowingly revealed to a third party. See, e.g., Kerr, supra
note 214, at 563.
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corporation’s decision making and any critical information that
might implicate privacy interests. Their privacy interests often
stand in conflict with the other corporate participants, and so
would not support a derivative right for the corporation. Corporations may have an important role to play in protecting the
privacy of outside stakeholders, such as customers, but such an
analysis would be limited to a more narrow, instrumental rationale for protection in that limited circumstance. All in all,
this analysis explains in a deeper way why it is unnecessary to
accord a constitutional right to privacy to public corporations:
there is not a person involved who needs the corporation itself
to hold that right in order to protect their constitutional privacy
interests.
2. Nonprofit and Private Corporations
Turning now to other types of corporations besides the
large, publicly held business corporation, we see that their purposes and dynamics vary widely. This section starts with brief
background about these other types of corporations and then
examines the potential privacy implications in these kinds of
corporations. This analysis keys up a fundamental question
about the corporate form and privacy, explored in the next section.
Nonprofits are characterized by being subject to “the
nondistribution constraint,” which prohibits a nonprofit from
distributing a profit to individuals who exercise control over
it—hence nonprofits do not have indicia of ownership or share228
holders. Participants include a board of directors, and poten229
tially also officers, employees, members, and donors. Nonprofit activities and size may vary widely. Nonprofits may serve the
mutual benefit of their members or patrons, like credit unions
and social clubs, or they may serve the public, like libraries,
230
schools, and museums. Nonprofits range in size from organi228. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 838, 844 (1980) (noting that the nondistribution constraint does not prohibit the nonprofit from earning a profit or paying salaries and perquisites to
employees, rather it prohibits distributing any profit to individuals who exercise control over the nonprofit).
229. Nonprofits may have members who elect the board of directors, but
this is not a requirement as they can have self-perpetuating boards. Id. at
841–42.
230. See id. at 840–42. Some nonprofits receive most of their income from
donations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army, whereas others receive
income by charging for their services, such as hospitals and the American Au-
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zations with billions of dollars in assets and thousands of employees, such as universities and foundations, to groups that
231
have virtually no assets and just a couple of people involved.
Private corporations are by contrast for-profit and not subject to the non-distribution constraint. Private corporation
structure is thus like that of public corporations with regard to
having a board of directors, officers, and shareholders, but in
the small private corporation the shareholders are not typically
a vast group of dispersed investors and there may be significant
232
overlap in the roles of shareholders, directors, and officers.
Like nonprofits, private corporations vary widely with regard to
the size of their assets and the number of people involved.
Some well-known examples of large private corporations are
233
Cargill, Koch Industries, and Mars. One of the largest, Cargill, had over 140,000 employees and revenues over $130 billion
234
But most private corporations are dramatically
in 2013.
smaller than these large examples and than public corpora235
tions. Incorporation is relatively simple and inexpensive, so
some very small businesses are formed as corporations despite
otherwise resembling a sole proprietorship or family busi236
ness.
In many instances nonprofit and private corporations may
be like public corporations in that there is little possibility of a
cognizable human privacy interest at stake that would be protected by granting the corporation a right to privacy. The role of
shareholders in private corporations is economic and not likely
tomobile Association. Id. Depending on their purpose, nonprofits may receive
substantial federal and state tax benefits. See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra
note 165, at 2026.
231. See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1261,
1293–311 (2011).
232. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making
of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 266 (2008).
233. See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/21/private-companies-10_rank.html.
234. CARGILL, http://www.cargill.com/company/glance/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
235. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 232, at 274.
236. One type of private corporation, the closely held corporation, is in fact
known by its characteristic small number of shareholders who are also often
participants in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation,
and by its lack of a ready market for the corporate stock. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 9 (2007). Some closely held corporations are personal or family ventures, with all of the stock held by a single family or group of friends and family. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (1986).
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to implicate decisional autonomy; in their role as investors they
do not participate in the corporation in a way that generates
personal information nor is there a requirement to publicly disclose their information.
Indeed, private corporations are not required to publicly
report under federal securities law, and therefore they are not
subject to disclosure requirements about their directors and of237
ficers. Thus, even when private corporations have individuals
who are strongly associated with the organization, such as
Mark Zuckerberg, the famous CEO of the formerly private
company Facebook, there is little likelihood of a privacy claim
arising to protect their interests.
Nonprofits are likewise not subject to public reporting under federal securities law, and, as noted, by definition they do
238
not have shareholders. Certain nonprofits, as tax-exempt organizations, must file an annual information return with the
239
Internal Revenue Service. This annual return, Form 990, is
intended to help the IRS detect tax abuse, and it requires a variety of information including a listing of officers, directors,
trustees, key employees, and highest compensated employees,
and reporting of certain compensation related to such per240
sons. In most instances any such information that is publicly
disclosed is not of a type that would implicate a privacy interest
241
of constitutional dimension.
A crucial distinction exists, however, between public corporations on the one hand and some nonprofits and private corporations on the other. The nexus between the individuals involved in a nonprofit or private corporation may be much closer
than in the case of public corporations—the dynamic more associational amongst all of the participants—and the purpose of
the nonprofit or private corporation may be in a realm more
237. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B)
(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2014).
238. See supra note 237.
239. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX, 3
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf.
240. Id. at 25; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 809 (2012) (identifying Form 990 as a
channel through which tax-exempt organizations provide information to the
IRS).
241. See Mayer, supra note 240, at 809–11 (discussing the public disclosure
of information provided by tax-exempt organizations to the IRS and exceptions
to such disclosure, such as information that identifies an organization’s donors).
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likely to implicate recognized privacy values—social, political,
or religious. A public corporation typically has primarily a
business purpose, with thousands of people involved in distinct
roles and heterogeneous interests and motives apart from a
242
general economic interest in the firm. By contrast, a nonprofit
corporation may have members associating together for a purpose that has traditionally been viewed as part of the private
243
realm of individuals and their personal lives. A private corporation may have primarily a business purpose, but be entirely
composed of shareholders, directors, and employees with family
244
or marital ties. The corporate documents may directly reflect
the family’s collective finances and activities, including information about the family members’ social associations, religious
affiliation, and political allies.
Thus, as corporations are not monolithic organizations, one
might imagine a spectrum—at one end there are corporations
with characteristics that suggest individuals could be involved
with privacy interests at stake that would be supported by a
corporate right to privacy. The privacy interest could stem from
the corporation being an organization that holds personal information or perhaps from the purpose or activities of the organization itself being related to a liberty or autonomy interest,
such as a small religious or political group. Because of the
wide-ranging variations in these sorts of organizations, and the
indeterminacy of privacy, various factual scenarios could raise
245
the potential for implicating privacy interests for the group.
The great bulk of these scenarios raise issues that could be
presented as First or Fourth Amendment claims, and there is
arguably no need to bring a right to privacy claim as such. For
242. See supra Part III.B.1.
243. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 228, at 837 (noting nonprofit institutions such as social clubs and churches).
244. See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1193–94 (2013) (arguing that “family businesses
are an extension of family relationships”).
245. For example, one scholar has argued that libraries and bookstores
might have used the right to informational privacy to challenge section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act. Michael J. O’Donnell, Reading for Terrorism: Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Constitutional Right to Information Privacy, 31 J. LEGIS. 45, 48 (2004). The provision has stirred a great deal of controversy as it allowed FBI officials to seek a court order compelling any “tangible item” relevant to counterintelligence or counterterrorism investigations,
including book records, without notice to individuals whose records had been
obtained. Id. at 45–47. The article did not examine whether status as a group
or corporation would have affected the ability of libraries and bookstores to
bring the right to privacy claim it suggested.

POLLMAN_4fmt

2014]

11/6/2014 3:54 PM

CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

81

example, the ACLU recently claimed that the government violated its First and Fourth Amendment rights by requiring Verizon to turn over on a daily basis the metadata of all of its customers’ phone calls, including the metadata of all ACLU phone
246
calls. The ACLU deputy director stated the government’s action “represents a gross infringement of the freedom of associa247
tion and the right to privacy,” but the complaint itself framed
the ACLU’s claims simply as First and Fourth Amendment violations without a specific claim to an independent right to pri248
vacy.
The concept of privacy is also bound up in the constitutional “freedom to associate,” a right that is understood to cover
249
groups, including corporations. This right has roots in the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech and assembly, which pro250
tect group autonomy. The key modern case recognizing the
freedom to associate is NAACP v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that state-compelled disclosure of the group’s
membership list was invalid “as entailing the likelihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members
251
of their right to freedom of association.” In so holding, the
Court stated that members of the nonprofit corporation had a
right to “pursue their lawful private interests privately and to
associate freely with others in doing so,” and it recognized “the

246. Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 13 Civ. 3994), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/nsa_phone_
spying_complaint.pdf.
247. ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of NSA Phone Spying Program, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 11, 2013), https://www.aclu
.org/national-security/aclu-files-lawsuit-challenging-constitutionality-nsa
-phone-spying-program.
248. Complaint, supra note 246. The court held that the ACLU had standing, but that the NSA’s metadata collection did not violate the First or Fourth
Amendment because of the third party doctrine, under which a person who
conveys information to a third party forfeits his right to privacy in the information. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738, 751.
249. For a discussion of the history and evolution of the related and sometimes overlapping rights of freedom of association, assembly, associational
privacy, and expressive association, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 982–1002 (2011). See also JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 9–10 (2012) (discussing
the link between privacy and association in the Court’s freedom of association
jurisprudence).
250. See Bhagwat, supra note 249, at 984–94.
251. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in
252
one’s associations.”
But while the concept of privacy is enmeshed in the freedom to associate and other rights, the right to privacy has
253
evolved separately and it may not be entirely overlapping.
What if, for example, the government did not seek the NAACP
membership list, but rather the donor list to the William J.
Clinton Presidential Library Foundation? When Congress
sought this information several years ago, nonprofits like the
Heritage Foundation and the Southern Poverty Law Center
254
protested that this was covered by the NAACP case. Other
commentators pointed out this was actually unclear because
the NAACP case relied on the rationale that the members
would face retaliation or physical danger if the list was disclosed—facts that were arguably absent for the library founda255
tion. After Citizens United, the calls for public disclosure of
information relating to politically active nonprofits and their
256
donors have only increased. Some commentators have discussed this issue in terms of privacy, rather than just First

252. Id. at 462, 466.
253. Scholars have argued for a more robust freedom of association or right
to assembly. For instance, John Inazu has expressed concern that the Court’s
modern association jurisprudence takes an overly narrow view of groups that
qualify as “expressive” and does not offer rigorous protections. See INAZU, supra note 249, at 3–4.
254. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of
the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 840–41 (2002).
255. Id. at 841; see also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 412
(2012) (arguing that, under one interpretation, the Court balanced the state’s
interest in “monitoring corporate activity” against the harm disclosure would
cause NAACP members).
256. See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act (the DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010);
S. 3295, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–05 (2011); Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and
Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 439–47 (2011). In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court confirmed
the constitutional validity of disclosure requirements with the exception of
when a reasonable probability exists that members or supporters of a group
would be subject to harassment or reprisals if their identities were disclosed.
130 S. Ct. 876, 913–17 (2010); see also Richard Briffault, Two Challenges For
Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 999 (2011) (discussing the Court’s disclosure jurisprudence and the possibility of changing the standards for an exemption).
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Amendment chilling effects or freedom of association. To be
sure, competing interests could properly outweigh such a privacy right, but the possibility exists that a privacy right would at
258
least be implicated.
To raise another possibility, what if the government did
not simply ask a nonprofit for its membership list, but instead
infiltrated and spied on the group? The history of the FBI and
other law enforcement engaging in this kind of surveillance is
wide-ranging, from infiltration of political groups like the Socialist Worker Party to mosques and other religious organiza259
tions. As with the ACLU v. Clapper case, scholarship and
case law have primarily focused on whether the surveillance
violates the First Amendment by chilling the exercise of free
260
speech or religion. But, what if the government also collected
and disclosed personal information regarding the members
without a legitimate law enforcement purpose? Depending on
the facts at hand, the group would plausibly have a privacy
claim.

257. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy
Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 861 (2011) (applying
information privacy theory to election law); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy
in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 661–66 (2010) (arguing
that denying corporations the right to anonymity in political speech is constitutionally legitimate because “corporations lack the kind of dignitary interests
that justify privacy for individuals”).
258. See Mayer, supra note 240, at 812 (discussing the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s recognition that “tax-exempt organizations have a right to privacy,”
but noting that the committee’s staff concluded that public interest generally
outweighed this right); see also WESTIN, supra note 20, at 25 (“The functions of
privacy in liberal systems do not require that it be an absolute right. The exercise of privacy creates dangers for a democracy that may call for social and legal responses. . . . Thus the constant search in democracies must be for the
proper boundary line in each specific situation and for an over-all equilibrium
that serves to strengthen democratic institutions and processes.”).
259. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt By Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 643 (2004)
(discussing religious and political surveillance); David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities
After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 132–41 (2010) (discussing
the FBI’s use of informants in mosques and other religious institutions);
Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41, 46–62
(2011) (describing FBI and Customs and Border Patrol interviews of U.S. Muslims).
260. See, e.g., Williams v. Price, 25 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629–30 (W.D. Pa.
1998) (finding surveillance chilled the plaintiff’s freedom to confer with his attorney); Sinnar, supra note 259, at 67–71.
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In sum, this examination suggests that, as with public corporations, there is little possibility of a cognizable privacy interest at stake that would justify granting nonprofit or private
corporations a constitutional right to privacy. However, it is
harder to rule out the possibility because some nonprofits and
private corporations may be appropriately described as associations of people and their activity may be in a realm more likely
to implicate recognized privacy values. To a great extent this
analysis underscores that in most circumstances, most corporations should not be accorded a constitutional right to privacy—
and it is a stretch to find scenarios that could not be more simply characterized as freedom of association, or First or Fourth
Amendment claims, which may provide more clearly established grounds. But the lines between these rights are not always well delineated, and the right to privacy may play an im261
portant role for some corporations in limited contexts.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE JURISPRUDENCE
One of the key contributions of this Article is measured
analysis explaining why most corporations in most circumstances should not have a claim to a constitutional right to privacy. The preceding section also raises the idea that there may
be limited instances when some nonprofit and private corporations could have a stronger claim for constitutional privacy, and
this puts into focus the remaining question to be explored here:
is there something specific about the right of privacy or the
261. Little work to date has explored whether a coherent distinction can be
drawn between allowing a group to claim the freedom to associate versus a
right to privacy—this could be a fruitful area for exploration as they may be
mutually supporting rights, and categorically denying all corporations a right
to privacy could undermine associational rights. Inazu has suggested that privacy in association cases protect the boundaries of group autonomy whereas
the right to privacy represented by Griswold serves as a guarantor of individual autonomy. INAZU, supra note 249, at 10. But there is reason to question
this distinction as the Court has often grounded the association cases in notions of protecting members, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958), and at times the Court has focused its privacy cases on
protecting a relation, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Further, a common view of the underlying motivation for group rights is support of individual autonomy, which suggests there is not always a bright line
between supporting individual autonomy and supporting group autonomy. See
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal
State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2010). Linda Fisher has suggested that
“[t]he overlapping constitutional right to informational privacy is . . . distinguishable [from the freedom of association] in that it focuses on protecting
personal information from unreasonable dissemination, rather than on avoiding interference with expressive activities.” Fisher, supra note 259, at 643.
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corporate form that would foreclose all corporations from claiming the right, even in the most compelling examples? This question underlies how the Court should address cases that arise in
this area, and more fundamentally, this question speaks to
deeper issues that corporate rights raise.
As a purely predictive matter, a strong possibility exists
that the Court would categorically deny all corporations the
constitutional right to privacy. Several indicators point in this
direction. First, the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence is a
limited patchwork of cases that do not clearly have binding application outside the confines of the particulars in precedent
262
cases. That is to say, the right to privacy is a thin reed for a
party to rely upon, arguably the recognition of a group right
would represent an expansion of the doctrine, and jurists may
be inclined to narrowly construe the right to avoid murky is263
sues of substantive due process. The Court might prefer that
groups seek legislative action to address changing privacy concerns rather than accord corporations the imprimatur of priva264
cy as a constitutional right. In addition, the Court has once
referred to the right to privacy just before mentioning the
“purely personal” framework, suggesting that it would put the
right to privacy in the same conceptual category as the privi262. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence.
263. For criticism of the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions, see, for example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 95–100, 110–26, 169–70
(1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173 (1979).
264. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right To Die and the Jurisprudence of
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 670–72, 686 (supporting the traditionalist
approach to adjudication of unenumerated rights and arguing that “[a] jurisprudence grounded in text and tradition is not hostile to social change, but it
assigns the responsibility to determine the pace and direction of change to
representative bodies”). Critics sometimes argue that unenumerated rights
invite judges to substitute their own personal values for those of the Constitution. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 263, at 89. But see Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 381, 381, 390 (1992) (noting that the distinction between enumerated
and unenumerated rights is “bogus” and “makes no sense, because it confuses
reference with interpretation”); see also David Alan Slansky, Two More Ways
Not To Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2474936 (challenging the idea in the Fourth Amendment context “that any
protections needed against government infringements of privacy in the Information Age are best developed outside of the courts and outside of constitutional law”).
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lege against self-incrimination—a right that inheres only in a
265
natural person’s individual capacity.
Thinking beyond predictions, however, such a categorical
denial of the right to corporations is not a foregone conclusion,
nor should it be. As this Article’s analysis suggests, corporations seldom have a claim to a constitutional right to privacy,
and so corporations as a broad category should not be accorded
a right to privacy. A categorical denial, however, would foreclose the possibility for organizations that support values protected by privacy to receive protection as new situations arise
and as the right to privacy evolves.
As explained in Part I.A., Morton Salt, decided in 1950,
predated the Court’s modern privacy jurisprudence and did not
make a broad ruling on the issue. Further, an aspect of the
Court’s privacy jurisprudence is interpersonal, suggesting a
foundation for recognizing a corporation as holding the right to
protect individuals involved. Specifically, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court framed the issue of the validity of the state
law forbidding use of contraceptives as about the “intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one as266
pect of that relation.” The Court notably did not focus the privacy protection on the individual, but rather on the “marriage
267
relationship.” The Griswold Court also referenced other areas
supporting group autonomy such as NAACP v. Alabama and
268
the “freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”
And the Court mentioned Sweezy v. New Hampshire, in which
it stressed “the freedom of the entire university community” in
reversing the contempt conviction of a professor who refused to
respond to questions during an investigation into subversive
269
activities. The Court included these examples to illustrate the
existence of “penumbras” of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights

265. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14
(1978) (“Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions denying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, [and] equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906) (categorically denying corporations the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
266. 381 U.S. at 482.
267. Id. at 486.
268. Id. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
462 (1958)).
269. Id. at 482 (discussing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–
50, 261–63 (1957)).
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270

that “help give them life and substance.” For our purposes,
these examples suggest an understanding that protecting a
group or association—or corporation—can support an individu271
al’s freedom and privacy in some limited instances. It also
raises the specter that while denying corporations the right to
privacy would be the correct result in most circumstances, it
could undercut the association jurisprudence.
Further, as problems of information privacy have become
increasingly urgent, scholars are beginning to explore how privacy has a social impact and how individuals can no longer effectively manage their privacy at the individual level through
272
notification and consent. The argument for rethinking the
third party doctrine and the relationship between consumers
and corporations also underscores the idea raised above that
273
corporations may serve as a useful check on the government.
As for the implications of the corporate form on the expectation of privacy, the debate about whether the corporation is
by nature public or private has raged for over a century and
274
there is no sign of it being settled. Corporations have both
275
public and private dimensions. Some theorists would draw

270. Id. at 484.
271. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 459 (“The Association . . . is but the medium
through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views.”); see also Hills, supra note 19, at 187–88 (discussing
how organizations advance individual autonomy).
272. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881–82 (2013) (noting privacy
“fosters a certain kind of society, since people’s decisions about their own privacy affect society, not just themselves”); see also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy
Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013) (arguing that innovation depends upon privacy); Richards, supra note 213, at 1945–52 (arguing that privacy protects intellectual pursuits); Strahilevitz, supra note 209, at 2012–20
(2013) (arguing that privacy protection has distributive effects).
273. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text; see, e.g., United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the premise “that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” because in modern times
“people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks”); see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 413–19 (2014)
(discussing how shared information can remain confidential).
274. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–66 (1992); Alan Wolfe, The Modern
Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673,
1673 (1993).
275. ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 131
(2013).
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the line between public and private much closer to one side or
the other. And, as one commentator noted, “[t]he line is drawn
276
differently in different times and different places.” What is
important for the rights analysis at hand is the observation
that the public/private distinction is not automatic. It varies by
context and observer. This suggests that the public dimensions
of the corporate form would not automatically foreclose a right
to privacy, though it could lessen such an expectation and the
separate legal identity of the corporation should not be forgotten.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the notoriously nebulous and controversial
constitutional right to privacy has left largely unexamined
whether that right applies to one of the key actors in society—
corporations. This Article takes up that question, first identifying and critically examining the growing and discordant case
law on the issue and then analyzing whether the purpose of the
privacy right would be served by according corporations that
right.
This analysis illuminates why most corporations should
not have a constitutional right to privacy. Simply put, in most
circumstances according the right would not serve its purpose
because people are not involved in a way that warrants that
protection. To grant corporations a right to privacy where no
one’s constitutional privacy interests would be served by doing
so would not only be misguided, it would further muddle and
undercut the already confused area of corporate rights. This
Article’s analysis also shows, however, that a categorical denial
may also be unwise in our world of wide-ranging corporations,
particularly given the evolving and indeterminate concept of
privacy we have. Certain corporations reflect an associational
dynamic, with tightly connected individuals pursuing activity,
social, political, or religious in nature, that has long been valued in fostering our societal goals of liberty and democracy.

276. Wolfe, supra note 274, at 1683.

